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Time and Punishment
RUSSELL L. CHRISTOPHER*
The predominant mode of punishment in modern times is the temporal term
of imprisonment. Such punishment is divisible in the sense that a constituent
part of a sentence of a temporal term of imprisonment also constitutes
punishment. Since all punishment requires justification, constituent parts of
temporal terms of imprisonment require justfication. The measure by which
retributivism, currently considered the leading theory of punishment,
justifies punishment-desert and proportionality-is only suited to justify
whole punishments. If the proportional and deserved punishment for an
offender's crime is (no less than) X time in prison, then a punishment of
part of X will necessarily be disproportional, undeserved, and unjustified.
Since a whole temporal term of imprisonment cannot be inflicted without
first inflicting a part of that whole punishment, retributivism's inability to
justify a part of a temporal term of imprisonment precludes retributivism
from justifying a whole temporal term of imprisonment as well. The
consensus approach of sentencing underlying state and federal sentencing
guidelines and codes as well as the proposed revised Model Penal Code
Sentencing provisions, combining both retributivist and consequentialist
principles, is also demonstrated to share this difficulty. As a result, this
Article advances the novel argument that neither the leading theoretical
account of punishment nor the consensus approach of sentencing is able to
justify any temporal term of imprisonment for any offender.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The implicit and unanalyzed assumption pervading punishment theory is
that if inflicting a sentence of punishment is justified, then inflicting a
constituent part of that punishment must also be justified. But under
retributivism, 1 which justifies only punishments that are deserved and
1 While there are varying accounts, retributivism most simply is a theory that
justifies punishment not because of its good consequences, but solely "because people
deserve it." Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347
(1983). Joel Feinberg furnishes the following concise account of retributivism:
Punishment is justified only on the ground that wrongdoing merits punishment.
It is morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his
wrongdoing. That a criminal should be punished follows from his guilt, and the
severity of the appropriate punishment depends on the depravity of the act. The state
of affairs where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally better than one where he
does not, and is so irrespective of consequences.
Joel Feinberg, Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 514, 515 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman
Gross eds., 2d ed. 1980). For a similar account, see John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules,
64 PHIL. REv. 3, 5 (1955). Michael Moore emphasizes that "[t]he distinctive aspect of
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proportional to the crime,2 this assumption will be shown to be false. As a
result, retributivism, currently considered the leading theory of punishment,
3
may be foreclosed from justifying the predominant mode of punishment in
modem times-temporal terms of imprisonment.4
retributivism is that the moral desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to punish him or
her...." MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 88 (1997). For other accounts of retributivism, see G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 101 at 129 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821) (describing retributive punishment as "the crime
turned round against itself"); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 42
(Dover Publications 1991) (1881) (explaining that retributivism "is the notion that there
is a mystic bond between wrong and punishment"); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS 140 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797) (requiring
that punishment "must always be inflicted upon [an offender] only because he has
committed a crime").
2 See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) ("The heart of the retribution
rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of
the criminal offender."); IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 12 (1989)
(listing the principle that "[p]unishment ought to be proportionate to the offense" as one
of the five fundamental tenets of retributivism); Stanley I. Benn, Punishment, in 7 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 29, 32 (Paul Edwards ed. 1967, reprint ed. 1972) (noting
that retributivism "insists that the punishment must fit the crime"); Feinberg, supra note
1, at 516 ("The proper amount of punishment to be inflicted upon the morally guilty
offender is that amount which fits, matches or is proportionate to the moral gravity of the
offense."); Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 347-48 (observing that for retributivism, "the
severity of punishment should be proportional to the degree of wrongdoing").
3 David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1623
(1992) ("It is widely acknowledged that retributivism... can fairly be regarded... as the
leading philosophical justification for the institution of criminal punishment.");
Developments in the Law-Alternative Punishments: Resistance and Inroads, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 1967, 1970 (1998) (explaining that "a 'just deserts' philosophy associated with
retributivism has claimed the mantle of penological predominance"). See Sanford Kadish,
Fifty Years of Criminal Law. An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943, 978-81
(1999) (charting retributivism's rise). But see Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of
Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 955 (2000) (maintaining that
consequentialism "is probably dominant over retributivism in criminal law scholarship").
4 See, e.g., LoIs G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
MANDATORY SENTENCING 71 (1994) ("With the exception of capital punishment, all
penalties for [serious] violations of law in the United States are framed as amounts of
time to be spent in prison."); NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 150
(1982) [hereinafter, MORRIS, CRIMINAL LAW] (noting that "imprisonment ... is, in
practice, the contemporary residual punishment"); Developments in the Law--The Law of
Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1838, 1841 (2002) ("Today, prisons are the primary means
of dispensing punishment for serious crimes, and their use is accelerating."); cf Norval
Morris & David J. Rothman, Introduction to THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE
PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY vii, vii (Norval Morris & David J.
Rothman eds., 1998) ("Meting out punishment by a calculus of time to be served seems
so commonsensical today, that it becomes difficult to conceive of a moment when prisons
20051
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Temporal terms of imprisonment are divisible in the sense that
constituent parts of such punishments also constitute punishment. 5 For
example, a sentence of twenty-years imprisonment contains parts-
imprisonment for one month, one year, five years, fifteen years, etc.-that
each constitute punishment. Since inflicting punishment requires
justification, 6 and parts of temporal terms of imprisonment constitute
punishment, then inflicting constituent parts of temporal terms of
imprisonment also require justification.
Whether a constituent part of a temporal term of imprisonment can be
justified is an important inquiry. A whole temporal term of imprisonment
cannot be inflicted without first inflicting a part of that temporal term of
imprisonment. For example, the punishment of twenty-years imprisonment
cannot be inflicted without first inflicting one-month, one-year, five-years,
ten-years, etc. imprisonment. Inflicting constituent parts of a whole
punishment is a necessary condition for inflicting the whole punishment.
Therefore, if infliction of a constituent part of a temporal term of
imprisonment cannot be justified, then infliction of the whole temporal term
of imprisonment cannot be justified.
To begin to appreciate retributivism's difficulty with justifying temporal
terms of imprisonment, consider the following illustration. Suppose that an
offender is convicted of a serious crime in a jurisdiction that has adopted a
retributivist punishment scheme 7 and receives a sentence of no less than
were not at the core of criminal justice.").
5 The following five elements comprise perhaps the most influential conceptual
definition of punishment:
(i) It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant.
(ii) It must be for an offence against legal rules.
(iii) It must be for an actual or supposed offender for his [or her] offence.
(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender.
(v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal
system against which the offence is committed.
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 4-5 (Oxford Univ. Press 1968). For other notable definitions of punishment, see
Antony Flew, The Justification of Punishment, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT: A
COLLECTION OF PAPERS 83, 85-87 (H.B. Acton ed., 1973); Kent Greenawalt,
Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1336, 1336-41 (Sanford Kadish
ed., 1983).
6 E.g., R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 1 (1986) ("It is agreed that a system of
criminal punishment stands in need of some strenuous and persuasive justification .. ");
Richard Wasserstrom, Why Punish the Guilty?, 20 PRINCETON UNIV. MAG. 14 (1964),
reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 328, 337 (Gertrude Ezorsky
ed., 1972) ("[Punishment's] infliction demands justification.").
7 Perhaps few, if any, states implement a purely retributivist punishment scheme, but
a few states come quite close. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2004)
[Vol. 66:269
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twenty-years imprisonment (or, alternatively, a sentence ranging from twenty
to twenty-five years of imprisonment). Suppose further that under
retributivism, (no less than) twenty-years imprisonment is the offender's
proportional and deserved8 punishment. After serving, say, five years of her
sentence, the prisoner objects that she is being unjustly punished: "I
understand that I may deserve twenty-years imprisonment as my proportional
punishment under retributivism, but what I have received thus far-five-
years imprisonment-is neither deserved nor is proportional to the crime I
committed. Under retributivism, I should not have to suffer what I do not
deserve in order that I may be given what I perhaps do deserve. Since my
punishment thus far is, and will continue to be (prior to serving the full
twenty years), undeserved, disproportional, and unjustified, then according to
retributivism's own principles, I must immediately be released from prison."
The prisoner's argument perhaps seems laughable because we implicitly
adopt a holistic perspective in thinking about the justification of punishment.
We implicitly assume that the relevant inquiry is whether the sentence or
whole punishment is justified. But since any sentence of punishment of a
temporal term of imprisonment will necessarily contain constituent parts that
also constitute punishment, and that which constitutes punishment requires
justification, a holistic perspective fails to accommodate the justification of
constituent parts. To justify the actual infliction of that which constitutes
punishment, the holistic perspective must be replaced by, or at least
supplemented with, an atomistic perspective accommodating the justification
of constituent parts. Since punishment may come either in the form of a
sentence or whole punishment as well as in the constituent parts of a whole
punishment, an atomistic perspective is crucial.
Perhaps we have tended to overlook the need for an atomistic perspective
("The Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is
punishment."). Noted criminal law scholar Sanford Kadish observes that the California
Legislature has thereby endorsed retributivism as the purpose of punishment. Sanford H.
Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 679, 701 (1994). See also Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The
Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 1313, 1356 (2000) (noting that "California endorsed retribution as 'the'
purpose for its punishment"). For the claim that Colorado and Pennsylvania feature
retributivist, or principally retributivist, punishment schemes, see id. at 1330, 1356.
However, nothing in the argument of this Article depends on whether there actually are
or are not jurisdictions adopting a purely retributivist approach.
8 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 88 ("The distinctive aspect of retributivism is that the
moral desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to punish him or her."); Hugo A. Bedau,
Concessions to Retribution in Punishment, in JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT 51, 52 (J.B.
Cederblom & William L. Blizek eds., 1977) ("[A] retributivist holds that a punishment is
just if and only if the offender deserves it."); Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 347 (noting
that retributivism is the view that "punishment is justified because people deserve it").
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(and even now are still quite skeptical) because of our implicit reliance on the
once-venerable legal doctrine of the greater includes the lesser. Stated
simply, the doctrine holds that the justifiability, permissibility, or power to
effect a greater course of action necessarily includes the justifiability,
permissibility, or power to effect a lesser course of action.9 Applying the
doctrine to the prisoner's claim, if the greater punishment of twenty-years
imprisonment is proportional, deserved, and justified, then the lesser five-
years imprisonment thus far must necessarily also be proportional, deserved,
and justified. While the doctrine may supply the "common-sense" 10 answer
to the prisoner's argument, the doctrine itself is logically suspect" 1 and has
recently fallen into disfavor by courts. 12 Moreover,. retributivism is
illustrative of why the doctrine is fallacious. Since retributivism justifies only
proportional punishment-no more and no less than what is deserved-,
naturally a lesser punishment is disproportional, undeserved, and
9 For example, a state's greater power to withhold a criminal defense altogether
includes the lesser power of conditioning the assertion of that defense on the defendant
bearing the burden of persuasion for that defense. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 211 (1977). For an early use of the greater includes the lesser doctrine, see Doyle v.
Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 542 (1876) ("If the State has the [greater] power to
cancel the license ... [i]t has the [lesser] power to determine for what causes and in what
manner the revocation shall be made.").
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is the doctrine's historical champion. See, e.g., Cass
R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (with
Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 597-99
(1990) (describing the doctrine as "Holmesianism"); Peter Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric
of "Rights," 33 UCLA L. REV. 977, 1011 n.87 (1986) (referring to Holmes as one of the
doctrine's "leading spokesmen"); Charles R. Bogle, Note, "Unconscionable"
Conditions: A Contractual Analysis of Conditions on Public Assistance Benefits, 94
COLuM. L. REV. 193, 197 n.14 (1994) (observing that Holmes is the doctrine's "greatest
proponent"). For an example of Holmes' use of the doctrine, see infra note 86.
10See, e.g., United States v. O'Neil, 11 F.3d 292, 296 (1st Cir. 1993) ("The
principle that the grant of a greater power includes the grant of a lesser power is a bit of
common sense that has been recognized in virtually every legal code from time
immemorial.").
11 See Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at "The Greater Includes the Lesser, " 55 VAND. L.
REV. 693, 708-11 (2002) (explaining that the claim that the greater necessarily entails the
lesser is logically invalid); Robert O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits
with Strings Attached, 54 CAL. L. REV. 443, 456-63 (1966) (same); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1415, 1428-56 (1989) (same).
12 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 511 (1996) ("[T]he
'greater-includes-the-lesser' argument should be rejected for the ... important reason that
it is inconsistent with both logic and well-settled doctrine."); Berman, supra note 11, at




unjustified. 13 So, for retributivism, that a greater punishment is proportional,
deserved, and justified does not entail that a lesser punishment is also
proportional, deserved, and justified. The inapplicability of the greater-
includes-the-lesser doctrine to retributivism suggests that our exclusive
reliance on a holistic perspective is misplaced.
Another possible common-sense solution is that it is necessary to first
punish for five years in order to be able to punish for twenty years, and what
is necessary must be justified. Punishing the offender first with five-years
imprisonment is a necessary means to obtaining the end-result of the prisoner
being punished for the full, deserved, proportional, and justified twenty-years
imprisonment. Thus, the end-result of twenty-years imprisonment of the
offender justifies the means-first punishing the prisoner for five years-by
which that end-result is obtained. But this argument that the end justifies the
means is an argument of consequentialisml 4-the principal alternative theory
of punishment 15-and, thus, unavailable to retributivism. 16
13 Under retributivism, both punishments greater than what is proportional and
deserved as well as punishments less than what is proportional and deserved are
disproportional, undeserved and thus unjustified. See, e.g., HEGEL, supra note 1, § 214 at
245 ("[A]n injustice is done if there is even one lash too many, or one dollar or groschen,
one week or one day in prison too many or too few."); NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL
TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL
SENTENCING SYSTEM 84 (1990) ("A thoroughgoing retributivist would claim that the
punishment to be imposed on an offender should be 'exactly as much as he [or she]
deserves, no more, no less."'); PRIMORATZ, supra note 2, at 162 (referring to punishments
that are "either too much, or too little, and in both cases disproportionate, and thus unjust
and wrong, from the standpoint of the retributive theory"); Jean Hampton, Correcting
Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1691
(1992) ("From a retributive point of view, punishments that are too lenient are as bad as
(and sometimes worse than) punishments that are too severe.").
14 Consequentialism as a theory of punishment justifies punishment not because the
offender deserves it, but rather because of the good consequences generated by
punishment. If the benefits or good consequences of punishment outweigh the costs or
bad consequences, punishment is justified. If not, punishment is unjustified. John Rawls
offers the following concise account:
[O]nly future consequences are material to present decisions, punishment is
justifiable only by reference to the probable consequences of maintaining it as one
of the devices of social order. Wrongs committed in the past are, as such, not
relevant considerations for deciding what to do. If punishment can be shown to
promote effectively the interest of society it is justifiable, otherwise it is not.
Rawls, supra note 1, at 5. For a comparison of consequentialism and retributivism, see
infra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.
15 E.g., PRIMORATZ, supra note 2, at 9 (noting that most of the moral justifications
for punishment are either consequentialist or retributive); A.M. Quinton, On Punishment,
14 ANALYSIS 512 (1954), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT,
supra note 6, at 6, (arguing that consequentialism and retributivism "exhaust the
2005]
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The prisoner's argument raises the difficulty for retributivism that
regardless of whether her punishment thus far is justified or unjustified, she
cannot justifiably be punished the remaining fifteen years of her presumably
proportional and deserved sentence. Assume arguendo that the offender's
five-years imprisonment thus far is justified. Since retributivism justifies
only deserved and proportional punishments, then her five-years
imprisonment thus far must be her deserved and proportional punishment-
no more and no less. 17 But if five-years imprisonment thus far is the deserved
and proportional punishment for the offender's crime, then that forecloses the
possibility that twenty-years imprisonment can be the deserved, proportional,
and justified punishment. Moreover, if her punishment thus far of five-years
imprisonment is the deserved and proportional punishment, then her
punishment is complete. If the five years thus far is the deserved and
proportional punishment, then any further punishment beyond the five years
thus far would be disproportional, undeserved, and unjustified. As a result,
even if we assume that the five-years imprisonment thus far is justified, the
prisoner still must be immediately released from prison because any
continued punishment would be disproportional, undeserved, and thus
unjustified under retributivism. And if instead the five-years imprisonment
thus far is unjustified, according to retributivism's own principles, the
prisoner must still be immediately released from prison. The prisoner's
seemingly absurd claim is becoming alarmingly plausible.
Regardless of whether the punishment thus far is justified or unjustified,
the prisoner cannot justifiably receive the very punishment that retributivism
finds deserved, proportional, and justified. Either way, under retributivism's
own principles, the prisoner must be immediately released from prison. And
this difficulty for retributivism would ensue not only for this particular
temporal term of imprisonment and this particular offender. 18 The difficulty
will arise under retributivism for any offender 0 whose deserved and
proportional punishment is any temporal term of imprisonment P. Since in
order to inflict P it is first necessary to inflict punishment less than P, and
any punishment less than P is disproportional and undeserved, inflicting P
necessarily entails inflicting disproportional, undeserved, and unjustified
punishment.
Retributivism's inability to justify any temporal term of imprisonment
possibilities" for justifying punishment).
16 See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 6, at 1 ("[A] common and defining feature of ...
[consequentialism is that it requires] punishment to be justified by reference to benefits to
which it is contingently related as a means to a further end.") (emphasis omitted). See
also infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
17 See supra notes 2, 8, 13, and accompanying text.
18 That is, there is nothing special in the circumstances of this particular offender
and this particular term of imprisonment. The problem is recurring and systemic.
[Vol. 66:269
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for any offender is not merely of theoretical concern. While few jurisdictions
adopt a purely retributivist sentencing philosophy, the perceived legitimacy
of theories of punishment, and retributivism, in particular, affects a host of
issues in criminal justice. 19 But of even greater practical significance is that
retributivism's failing is shared by a mixed or hybrid theory of punishment,
embracing both retributivist and consequentialist principles, that is variously
termed "modified just desert," "limiting retributivism," or simply "LR. '' 20 LR
is widely recognized as the "consensus" model of state and federal
sentencing codes and guidelines 2' as well as the newly proposed revised
19 With respect to the influence of theories of punishment in general, the theories a
jurisdiction adopts "affect jury selection, instructions, and arguments; sentencing and
parole; and even assessment of the legitimacy of particular punishments." Cotton, supra
note 7, at 1317. With respect to the influence of retributivism in particular, see, for
example, Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984) (endorsing retributivism as the
"primary justification of the death penalty"); Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith,
Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 117
(2000) (noting retributivism's influence on the decline of systems of probation and
parole); Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutor's Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments,
72 FORDHAM L. REv. 93, 118-34 (2003) (contending that the perceived illegitimacy of
plea bargains and immunity deals stems largely from retributivism); Robert J. Cottrol,
Hard Choices and Shifted Burdens: American Crime and American Justice at the End of
the Century, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 507-08 (1997) (book review) ("[S]ince the
mid-seventies retribution has come back with a vengeance, enjoying today a greater
prominence in public discourse over crime and punishment than at any other time in post-
war America. Nowhere is this mood better demonstrated than in the debate over the death
penalty."); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 1303 (2001) (.'[T]hree-strikes-and-you're-out' policies ... seem to be fueled by
concerns about retribution ...."); Richard S. Murphy, The Significance of Victim Harm:
Booth v. Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1303, 1308 (1988) (explaining retributivism's opposition to aspects of the
victims' rights movement); Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to
Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 65, 67 (1999) (same).
20 For the equivalence of "modified just desert" and "limiting retributivism," see
Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using
the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 19, 24 n. 18,
51-52 (2003).
21 Richard S. Frase, Limiting Retributivism: The Consensus Model of Criminal
Punishment, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Michael Tonry ed.,
forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 2) (on file with author) ("[I]t is clear that some sort of
limiting retributive (LR) theory is already the consensus model."), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=420324 (last visited August 20,
2004). Modified just desert or LR underlies both state and federal sentencing guidelines:
[T]he vast majority of the federal sentencing guidelines clearly implement a
philosophy of punishment commonly called "modified just desert." Strikingly, this
is the same philosophy adopted by every state sentencing commission that has
issued sentencing guidelines. It appears to be emerging as the dominant philosophy
2005]
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Model Penal Code Sentencing provisions of the American Law Institute. 22
LR's considerable influence in sentencing codes and guidelines stems
from its appealing combination of both retributivist and consequentialist
principles. 23 The retributivist principles of desert and proportionality
determine the lower and upper limits of a range of justified punishment. 24
Only within that range may consequentialist considerations of deterrence,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation influence a sentence. 25 Though not purely
retributivist, LR is also unable to justify temporal terms of imprisonment.
This is because the early stages of any temporal term of imprisonment will
necessarily be less than the deserved and proportional minimum punishment
under LR. For example, suppose that LR justifies a range of deserved
punishment for our offender of between twenty to twenty-five years of
imprisonment. At the five-year stage of the offender's term of imprisonment,
the offender's punishment is less than, and thus outside of, the range of
deserved and justified punishment under LR. As a result, the predominant
approach in state and federal sentencing cannot justify temporal terms of
imprisonment.
That any sentencing approach setting a minimum punishment based on
the retributivist principles of desert and proportionality fails to justify
temporal terms of imprisonment provides support for abolishing the much-
maligned "mandatory minimums."26 For perhaps the most widely known
of sentencing in America today.
Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 20, at 24.
22 See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 36-37
(Kevin R. Reitz, Reporter, April 11, 2003,) (report submitted to the members of the ALl
for their consideration at the annual meeting May 12-14, 2003) ("The approach in black-
letter drafting is borrowed from Norval Morris's theory of 'limiting retributivism' (or
LR).") (citation omitted); Kevin R. Reitz, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code:
Sentencing, Plan for Revision, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 525, 528 (2002) ("The new
ordering of sentencing purposes recommended for the revised Code is an adaptation of
Norval Morris's theory of limited retributivism ... ").
23 See, e.g., Reitz, supra note 22, at 528-29 ("Limiting retributivism provides a
flexible theoretical base and allows for the possibility that different purposes, or
combinations of purposes, can be assigned priority positions for different classes of
criminal offenses.").
24 See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 78 (1974)
(establishing "a retributive floor to punishment as well as a retributive ceiling"). For
further discussion, see infra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., MORRIS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 4, at 167 ("In the fine-tuning of
punishment between the upper and lower limits of retributively deserved punishment ...
utilitarian values should apply."). For further discussion, see infra note 145 and
accompanying text.
26 The U.S. Sentencing Commission provides the following concise account:
[Mandatory minimums] refer to statutory provisions requiring the imposition of at
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example, the sale of either 5000 grams or more of powder cocaine or 50
grams or more of crack cocaine is punishable by imprisonment for no less
than ten years.27 In recent public addresses Supreme Court Justices Kennedy
and Breyer have fervently advocated Congress to repeal mandatory minimum
sentencing.28 In addition to perhaps a majority of Supreme Court Justices
opposed to mandatory minimums,29 twelve federal courts of appeals have
issued statements declaring their opposition.30 While mandatory minimums
least a specified minimum sentence when criteria specified in the relevant statute
have been met. Criteria requiring imposition of minimum sentences vary. For
example, some mandatory sentences are triggered by offense characteristics, such as
an amount of drugs or where the drugs were sold. Others are triggered by offender
characteristics, such as the prior conviction for the same offense, or by victim
characteristics, such as the age of the person to whom the drugs were sold.
U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (1991) (citations
omitted). For a history of the development of mandatory minimum sentencing, see id. at
5-10. For criticisms of mandatory minimums, see, for example, id. at ii-iv (summarizing
the ineffectiveness and sentencing disparity engendered by mandatory minimums); Gary
T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of
Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 121 (1993) (contending that
mandatory minimums are ineffective, are applied in a discriminatory fashion against
minorities, generate sentencing disparity, penalize defendants for asserting constitutional
rights, and vest too much power in prosecutors). For further criticisms of mandatory
minimums, see infra notes 154-163 and accompanying text. For further discussion of
mandatory minimums, see infra Part IV.B.
27 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1994). This amounts
to a 100:1 ratio in the severity of punishment for crack cocaine as compared to powder
cocaine. This ratio, and its disparate racial impact on minorities, has survived equal
protection challenges in the Supreme Court, United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456
(1996), as well as in every federal court of appeals. Charles Doyle, Federal Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing Statutes, in MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING: OVERVIEW AND
BACKGROUND 47, 71 n.79 (Lawrence V. Brinkley ed., 2003).
28 Justice Stephen Breyer, Remarks at the John F. Kennedy Library and Foundation
Forum 10-11 (Sept. 21, 2003) (transcript at http://www.jfklibrary.org/forumbryer.html)
(last visited Feb. 25, 2004) (commenting that mandatory minimum sentences are both bad
policy and unfair); Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Address at the American Bar
Association Annual Meeting 2-5 (Aug. 9, 2003; rev. Aug. 14, 2003) (transcript at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html) (last visited Feb.
28, 2004) (contending that mandatory minimums are excessively harsh and too costly).
For further discussion of Justice Breyer's and Justice Kennedy's views on mandatory
minimum sentencing, see infra notes 156-162, 167, 173, and accompanying text.
29 Breyer, supra note 28, at 10 (referring to himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Kennedy "and others on our court" as being opposed to mandatory minimum sentencing).
30 Suzanne Cavanagh & David Teasley, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing for
Federal Crimes: Overview and Analysis, in MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING:
OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 27, at 1, 10.
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are motivated by a variety of sentencing concerns, 31 retributivism is
identified as the primary support and motivation.32 To the extent that
retributivism or LR33 does motivate mandatory minimums, this Article
provides the conceptual framework to abolish mandatory minimums.
This Article advances the novel argument that neither retributivism nor
any scheme of punishment setting a minimum punishment based on the
retributivist principles of desert and proportionality is able to justify any
temporal term of imprisonment for any offender. 34 Part II explicates
retributivism by contrasting it with consequentialism. Part III poses a number
of conditions or criteria that any claimed retributivist justification of
temporal terms of imprisonment must satisfy and explains retributivism's
difficulty with meeting them. This Part also canvasses the other, principal
theories' successful justifications of such punishment; but these justifications
are unavailable to, and incompatible with, retributivism. In light of the
radical and no doubt counter-intuitive nature of the thesis advanced in this
Article, Part IV anticipates a number of possible attempts in identifying a
31 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 13-14 (listing "six commonly-
offered rationales for mandatory minimum sentencing:" (i) retribution/just deserts, (ii)
deterrence, (iii) incapacitation, (iv) reduction of sentencing disparity, (v) inducement of
witnesses suppling inculpatory information on the criminal activity of others, and (vi)
inducement of guilty pleas).
32 See, e.g., id. at 13 (reporting that a retributivist/just deserts approach is "the most
commonly-voiced goal of mandatory minimum penalties"). For further discussion, see
infra notes 165-173 and accompanying text.
33 FORER, supra note 4, at 53 ("Norval Morris's theories [of LR] underlie these laws
[mandatory minimum sentencing].").
34 This problem is distinct from the standard criticism that retributivism lacks a
precise calculus for determining how much punishment an offender deserves for any
given crime:
The most common challenge to retributivism has been its alleged vagueness:
everyone may agree that five years in prison is unjustly harsh for shoplifting, or that
a five dollar fine is unjustly lenient desert for rape, but beyond such clear cases our
intuitions seem to fail us. Is two years, five years, or ten years the proper sanction
for rape? ... Our sense of just deserts here seems to desert us.
Leo Katz, Criminal Law, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 80, 80-81 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). See, e.g., A.C. EWING, THE MORALITY
OF PuNISHMENT 40 (1929) (discussing, with respect to retributivism, "the impossibility of
estimating the moral guilt of the offender and the degree of punishment proportionate to
it"); Dolinko, supra note 3, at 1636 ("[A] stock objection to retributivism [is] that there is
simply no workable way to determine just what punishment a criminal deserves."). The
problem for retributivism of the indeterminacy of proportionality is circumvented here by
stipulating what the deserved, proportional punishment is for the offender's offense-
twenty-years imprisonment. The difficulty of retributivism addressed in this Article is not
the determination of what the proportional punishment is, but rather retributivism's
inability to justify any temporal term of imprisonment for any offender's offense.
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retributivist justification for temporal terms of imprisonment. But, as is
explained, none of these attempted solutions are successful. Part V
demonstrates that the inability to justify temporal terms of imprisonment is
not limited to retributivism and is not merely of theoretical interest. The
predominant sentencing approach, undergirding state and federal sentencing
guidelines and codes as well as the newly proposed revisions of the Model
Penal Code Sentencing provisions, embracing a mixture of both retributivist
and consequentialist principles, also fails to justify temporal terms of
imprisonment.
This Article concludes that neither the leading theoretical account of
punishment nor the consensus approach in sentencing guidelines and codes is
able to justify the predominant mode of punishment-temporal terms of
imprisonment. In order to justify temporal terms of imprisonment, either
consequentialism or a mixed theory (setting the lower limit of punishment
based on consequentialist concerns and setting the upper limit on either
retributivist or consequentialist principles) must be adopted.
II. RETRIBUTIVISM VERSUS CONSEQUENTIALISM
Punishment requires justification because it consists of the deliberate
infliction of pain, suffering, and deprivation, which is prima facie wrong.35
Although most agree that punishment is susceptible to justification, the age-
old debate36 over the justification of punishment stems largely from the
impasse between retributivism and consequentialism. 37 A consequentialist
account justifies punishment, not because the offender deserves it, but
because of the good consequences generated by punishment. 38 In contrast,
35 See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION 170 (Ch. XIII) (Prometheus Books 1988) (1781) (stating that "all
punishment in itself is evil"); HEGEL, supra note 1, § 92 at 120 (because "coercion
[which], taken in the abstract, is therefore, contrary to right") (emphasis omitted); C.L.
TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 3 (1987) ("We
are not normally justified in depriving people of the things which they value, such as their
liberty .. "); see also supra note 6.
3 6 See, e.g., A. John Simmons et al., Introduction to PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHY
AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS READER i, vii (A. John Simmons et al. eds., 1995) ("The problem of
justifying legal punishment has remained at the heart of legal and social philosophy from
the very earliest recorded philosophical texts to the most recent.").
37 See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 3 (2001) ("The
philosophy of punishment has long been a battleground for various versions of
consequentialism. . . and retributivism .... ")..
38 The leading influence on, and most well-known version of, the consequentialist
justification of punishment is Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism. PRIMORATZ, supra note 2,
at 13 ("[T]he most comprehensive and thoroughly developed formulation of the theory in
philosophical literature is still to be found in the writings of Bentham."). If punishment
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retributivism justifies punishment not by recourse to the good consequences
promoted, but solely because the offender deserves it.39
While consequentialism conceives of punishment as a means to an end,40
retributivism views punishment as an end, or good, in itself.41 Under
generates more utility, happiness, pleasure, or good consequences than disutility,
suffering, pain, or bad consequences, then punishment is eligible to be justified. For
Bentham, conduct is to be judged according to the principle of utility, BENTHAM, supra
note 35, at 2 ("By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or
disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to
have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party .. ") (footnote omitted). The
utility or good consequences to be promoted by punishment generally entails crime
prevention. According to Bentham, "[t]he immediate principal end of punishment is to
control action." Id. at 170 n. 1. "General [crime] prevention ought to be the chief end of
punishment, as it is its real justification." 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law,
in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 396 (John Bowring ed., 1962). See, e.g., JEFFRIE G.
MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO
JURISPRUDENCE 118 (rev. ed. 1990) ("While incapacitation and reform may sometimes
figure in the justification of punishment, deterrence has always been the mainstay .. ");
PRIMORATZ, supra note 2, at 10 ("The most important consequences of punishment are its
preventive effects.").
39 The theories of Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel exert the greatest historical
influence on retributivism. PRIMORATZ, supra note 2, at 13 ("The most important and
influential among classical retributivists are Kant and Hegel."). Kant articulates the
fundamental retributivist thesis: punishment "must always be inflicted upon him [an
offender] only because he has committed a crime." KANT, supra note 1, at 140. See
Quinton, supra note 15, at 7 ("The essential contention of retributivism is that
punishment is only justified by guilt.").
For Hegel, retribution is the bond that welds crime to punishment. HEGEL, supra
note 1, § 101 at 129 (explaining that committing the criminal "deed brings its own
retribution with it"). Punishment is justified because it annuls, cancels or negates crime.
See PRIMORATZ, supra note 2, at 74 (observing that punishment as the annulment of an
offense is "one of the basic tenets of his [Hegel's] theory of punishment"). Hegel
explains that both punishment (in the abstract) and crime are forms of coercion. Crime is
the first or "initial use" of coercion. HEGEL, supra note 1, § 95 at 121. Hegel refers to
punishment as the subsequent or "second coercion." Id § 93 at 120. Because "coercion is
cancelled by coercion; it [punishment] is therefore not only conditionally right but
necessary-namely as a second coercion which cancels an initial coercion." Id.
(emphasis omitted). By being, in Hegel's famous phrase, "a negation of the negation," id.
§ 97 at 123, punishment is a "restoration of right." Id. § 99 at 124.
40 See R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of
Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUSTICE 1, 5-6 (1996).
41 See KANT, supra note 1, at 140 ("Punishment... can never be inflicted merely as
a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society."); see
also Rawls, supra note 1, at 5 ("The state of affairs where a wrongdoer suffers
punishment is morally better than the state of affairs where he does not; and it is better
irrespective of any of the consequences of punishing him.").
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consequentialism, punishment is an evil42 that should not be imposed unless
outweighed by the good consequences it generates. 43 That is, the ends (the
good consequences of, for example, deterrence and crime prevention)
generated by punishment justify the means (punishment) by which those
good consequences are generated. Thus, under consequentialism, punishment
is an instrumental good-that which lacks independent value but leads to
other goods that do independently have value.44 In contrast, under
retributivism, punishment is its own end; punishment is an intrinsic good-a
good that has independent value even if it does not lead to other goods.45 As
a result, whereas consequentialism is prospective in seeking to promote
future good, retributivism is retrospective in seeking to do justice for a crime
already committed. 46
42 BENTHAM, supra note 35, at 170 ("[P]unishment is mischief: all punishment in
itself is evil.").
43 Id. (maintaining that punishment "ought only to be admitted in as far as it
promises to exclude some greater evil") (footnote omitted). Punishment of an offender is
impermissible if the cost of punishment outweighs its good consequences. According to
Bentham, punishment should not be inflicted at all under either of the following four
conditions, where punishment would be: (i) "groundless" because there is no crime or
harm, (ii) "inefficacious" because the crime cannot be deterred, (iii) "unprofitable, or too
expensive" because the evil of the punishment would exceed the crime, and (iv)
"needless" because the crime may be deterred by other means than punishment or does
not require deterrence. Id. at 171-77, 314-23.
44 For discussion of the instrumental good/intrinsic good distinction, see WILLIAM
FRANKENA, ETHICS 80-83 (1973); GERALD F. GAUSS, VALUE AND JUSTIFICATION: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERAL THEORY 126-30 (1990); G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 25-
30 (1903); MOORE, supra note 1, at 157; ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLANATIONS 414 (1981); Duff, supra note 40, at 5-7.
45 MOORE, supra note 1, at 157 ("[W]hat is distinctively retributivist is the view that
the guilty receiving their just deserts is an intrinsic good.") (emphasis omitted). For the
view that retributive punishment is understood as an intrinsic good see, for example,
MOORE, supra note 1, at 157; NOZICK, supra note 44, at 374; Benn, supra note 2, at 30;
Lawrence Davis, They Deserve to Suffer, 32 ANALYSIS 136, 136 (1972); Duff, supra note
40, at 6.
46 Retributivism roots the justification of punishment not prospectively in
punishment's consequences, Gertrude Ezorsky, The Ethics of Punishment, in
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT, supra note 6, at xi, xviii ("For all
retributivists punishment has moral worth independently of any further desirable
effects."), but retrospectively in punishment's relation to a past offense. BERNARD
BOSANQUET, SOME SUGGESTIONS IN ETHICS 188 (1919) (commenting that retributive
"[p]unishment is primafacie retrospective; it deals with the past"); DUFF, supra note 6, at
4 (explaining that "all [retributivist theories] find the sense and the justification of
punishment in its relation to a past offence"); HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND
INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 38 (1976) (noting
that retributive "[p]unishment, then, focuses on the past"); A. Wesley Cragg, Punishment,
in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 706, 707-08 (Christopher Berry Gray
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While consequentialism determines the degree of punishment for a given
offense based on maximizing the consequence sought to be promoted, 47
retributivism bases the degree of punishment solely on the degree of desert of
an offender. For Immanuel Kant, the degree of punishment is based on the
specific equality between crime and punishment:48 "what is done to [the
offender] in accordance with penal law is what he has perpetrated on
others." 49 This is the principle underpinning Kant's account of the lex
talionis5° of an "eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" featured in the Bible.51
Though adopting the principle of "what the criminal has done should also
happen to him,"52 G.W.F. Hegel only requires a general equality between the
crime and its punishment.53 With the rise of incarceration as the predominant
ed., 1999) (referring to retributivism as "backward-looking" and consequentialism as
"forward-looking").
47 Bentham promulgates an elaborate set of rules for determining the degree of
punishment for the commission of an offense. Because punishment is an evil, the upper
limit on how much punishment may be imposed is no more than what is "necessary" to
sufficiently deter crime. BENTHAM, supra note 35, at 182. The minimum or lower limit of
the degree of punishment is based, in substantial part, on the conjunctive effect of three
rules: (i) the punishment must be "sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence,"
id. at 179 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted), (ii) the greater degree of temptation to
commit the offense, the greater the degree of punishment, id. at 180, and (iii) the greater
the degree of harm or "mischief' the offense causes, the greater the degree of
punishment. Id. at 181 (emphasis omitted).
48 KANT, supra note 1, at 141.
49 Id. at 169.
50 Kant sets forth the following famous account of the principle of the lex talionis:
[W]hatever undeserved evil you inflict upon another within the people, that you
inflict upon yourself. If you insult him, you insult yourself; if you steal from him,
you steal from yourself; if you strike him, you strike yourself; if you kill him, you
kill yourself. But only the law of retribution (ius talionis)... can specify definitely
the quality and the quantity of punishment; all other principles are fluctuating and
unsuited for a sentence of pure and strict justice because extraneous considerations
are mixed into them.
Id. at 141.
51 Exodus 21:24.
52 HEGEL, supra note 1, § 101 at 127 (emphasis omitted).
53 Hegel acknowledges that Kant's simple version of the lex talionis may be reduced
to the absurd:
[I]t is very easy to portray the retributive aspect of punishment as an absurdity (theft
as retribution for theft, robbery for robbery, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a
tooth, so that one can even imagine the miscreant as one-eyed or toothless); but the
concept has nothing to do with this absurdity, for which the introduction of that
[idea of] specific equality is alone to blame.
Id. § 101 at 128 (emphasis omitted). Rather than a specific equality between a crime and
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mode of punishment and the corresponding decline of the corporal
punishments featured in the lex talionis, modem retributivists typically no
longer adhere to the lex talionis,54.but rather simply require that punishment
be proportional to the crime and the offender's just deserts. 55
III. JUSTIFYING TEMPORAL TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT
This Part first supplies six conditions or criteria that any attempt at a
retributivist justification of temporal terms of imprisonment must satisfy.
This Part next demonstrates that the other principal theories of punishment
can successfully justify temporal terms of imprisonment. But these
justifications are incompatible with retributivism and only raise further
conditions for any claimed retributivist justification to satisfy. These
conditions or criteria should be understood conjunctively. An adequate
retributivist justification of temporal terms of imprisonment must satisfy
them all.
A. Conditions for a Retributivist Justification
This section presents six conditions or criteria for an adequate
retributivist justification of temporal terms of imprisonment and explains the
difficulty in satisfying them. First, the offender's punishment thus far must
be shown to be proportional, despite that only the offender's whole
punishment is proportional. Second, the offender's punishment thus far must
its punishment (e.g., theft as retribution for theft), Hegel requires merely that they be
generally equal, or comparable:
Equality remains merely the basic measure of the criminal's essential deserts, but
not of the specific external shape which the retribution should take. It is only in
terms of this specific shape that theft and robbery [on the one hand] and fines and
imprisonment etc. [on the other] are completely unequal, whereas in terms of their
value, i.e. their universal character as injuries [Verletzungen], they are comparable.
Id. § 101 at 129. In this way, the absurdities of Kant's simple lex talionis are avoided. For
example, a penniless thief may be adequately punished by a term of imprisonment
comparable in character and value to the theft.
54 E.g., MOORE, supra note 1, at 88 ("It is quite possible to be a retributivist and to
be against... lex talionis...."); see HUGO A. BEDAU, DEATH is DIFFERENT 262-63 n.61
(1987) (listing numerous modern retributivist theories rejecting the lex talionis).
55 E.g., HART, supra note 5, at 234 (noting that "modern retributive theory is
concerned with proportionality"); MOORE, supra note 1, at 88 (observing that
"retributivists ... are committed to the principle that punishment should be graded in
proportion to desert"). For the view that proportionality is exclusively a principle of
retributivism, see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991) (It is "difficult even to
speak intelligently of 'proportionality,' once deterrence and rehabilitation are given
significant weight. Proportionality is inherently a retributive concept .... ").
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be shown to constitute an intrinsic good, despite that only the offender's
whole punishment is an intrinsic good. Third, any asserted justification of the
offender's punishment thus far must utilize a retrospective outlook, despite
that such a perspective is only helpful in justifying the whole punishment.
Fourth, any claimed justification of the offender's punishment thus far must
not also justify the offender receiving only the punishment thus far and no
more. Fifth, any purported justification must supply an adequate explanation
as to why the punishment thus far is justified, but the offender receiving only
the punishment thus far would be unjustified. Sixth, any propounded
justification of the offender's punishment thus far must not preclude the
remainder of the punishment under the sentence from being justified.
1. Proportionality and Desert
For a punishment to be justified under retributivism, the punishment
must be proportional to the offender's desert or crime. 56 An offender's desert
is determined by the degree of wrongdoing committed and the degree of
culpability with which the wrongdoing was committed.57 If twenty-years
imprisonment is the offender's deserved and proportional punishment, either
more than or less than twenty-years imprisonment is disproportional,
undeserved, and unjustified. 58 Since the five-years imprisonment thus far is
less than the deserved and proportional punishment of twenty-years
imprisonment, the five-years imprisonment thus far is undeserved and
disproportional. And since the prisoner's punishment thus far is
disproportional and undeserved, it is unjustified.
2. Intrinsic Good
Retributivism views deserved and proportional punishment as an
intrinsic good 59-"right or good in itself, apart from the further consequences
to which it might lead."' 60 While the five-years imprisonment thus far might
be of instrumental value in leading to the offender being punished for twenty
years, it is not an intrinsic good. Under retributivism, only those punishments
56 See supra notes 2, 55, and accompanying text.
57 See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 1, at 71 ("The meaning of desert: that the desert
which triggers retributive punishment is itself a product of the moral wrong(s) done by an
individual, and the moral culpability with which he did those wrongs."); see also supra
notes 2, 55, and accompanying text.
58 See supra note 13.
59 See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 1, at 87-88 ("Punishment of the guilty is thus for the
retributivist an intrinsic good, not the merely instrumental good that it may be to the
[consequentialist]."); see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
60 NOZICK, supra note 44, at 374.
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that are deserved and proportional are intrinsic goods.61 Since the five-years
imprisonment thus far is undeserved and disproportional, it is not an intrinsic
good.
Even if we assume arguendo that the five-years imprisonment thus far is
an intrinsic good, that premise leads to the false conclusion. that
imprisonment of only five years is an intrinsic good. For the five-years
imprisonment thus far to be good in itself regardless of what else happens, it
must be good even if the prisoner escaped from prison today, received no
further punishment, and therefore received only five-years imprisonment.
That is, if five years thus far of imprisonment is an intrinsic good, then the
prisoner being punished for only five years must also be an intrinsic good.
But retributivists themselves would treat punishment of only a part of a
deserved and proportional punishment as neither an intrinsic good nor
justified.62 Since the premise that the five years thus far of imprisonment is
an intrinsic good generates the false conclusion that imprisonment of only
five years for the offender is also an intrinsic good, we might properly reject
the premise. And if the offender's punishment thus far is not an intrinsic
good, then it cannot be justified under retributivism.
3. Retrospective Outlook
In justifying punishment, retributivism adopts a retrospective outlook.63
Retributivism looks not forward to good future consequences, but rather
backward to the crime committed for the source of justifying punishment.
Looking backward to the crime committed affords a determination of an
offender's desert that is a function of the crime's gravity and the degree of
culpability with which the crime was committed.64 The offender's desert is
such that the punishment proportional to that desert is twenty-years
imprisonment. Thus, a retrospective outlook is only helpful in justifying the
whole twenty-years imprisonment, but not the five-years imprisonment thus
far.
61 Since "the guilty receiving their just deserts is an intrinsic good, " MooRE, supra
note 1, at 157, and "retributivists ... are committed to the principle that punishment
should be graded in proportion to desert," id. at 88, only punishments that are
proportional are intrinsic goods.
62 The punishment of only five-years imprisonment is clearly unjustified under
retributivism because the stipulated proportional, deserved punishment for our
hypothetical offender's crime is twenty-years imprisonment.
63 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
64 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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4. Punishment of Only a Part Unjustified
Whatever argument that might be advanced to justify the five-years
imprisonment thus far must not be so strong as to also justify punishment of
only five-years imprisonment. A punishment of only five-years imprisonment
is clearly unjustified under retributivism for the offender's crime because it is
disproportional to the offender's desert. Thus, any asserted justification of
the five-years imprisonment thus far that also justifies punishment of only
five- years imprisonment would be untenable.
5. Explanation of Part Thus Far/Only a Part Distinction
Since punishment of only five-years imprisonment for the offender is
clearly unjustified under retributivism, 65 any attempt at a justification for the
five-years imprisonment thus far must explain the difference supporting their
differential treatment under retributivism. The only apparent difference is
that punishment of only five-years imprisonment precludes the possibility of
the offender being punished the full twenty-years imprisonment. In contrast,
punishment of five-years imprisonment thus far affords that possibility. But
justifying the five-years imprisonment thus far, based on this difference, is
justifying it prospectively, by the possible future effect or consequence that it
will lead to twenty-years imprisonment. The five-years imprisonment thus
far would then not be an intrinsic good, as required by retributivism, 66 but
only an instrumental good.67 Such a justification is consequentialist and
thereby unavailable to retributivism. 68 Since the only apparent difference
between punishing only five years versus five years thus far is that which
supports a consequentialist justification, retributivism lacks a satisfactory
basis for explaining why punishment of only five years is unjustified and
why punishment of five years thus far is justified.
6. Punishment of Remainder of Sentence Justified
Whatever argument that might be advanced to justify the five-years
imprisonment thus far must not render unjustified the remaining fifteen years
on the offender's proportional sentence of twenty-years imprisonment. To
illustrate this condition, assume arguendo that the five-years imprisonment
thus far is justified. Since it is justified, and the only punishment which
retributivism justifies is deserved and proportional punishment, then there
65 See supra note 62.
66 See supra notes 45, 59-60, and accompanying text.
67 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
68 See supra notes 44, 59, and accompanying text.
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would be no justification for punishing the offender the remaining fifteen
years. That is, if the five-years imprisonment thus far is justified, then it must
be deserved and proportional. But if it is deserved and proportional-no
more and no less-, then any further imprisonment beyond the five years
thus far would be undeserved and disproportional. As a result, a justification
for the five-years imprisonment thus far may foreclose retributivism from
being able to justify the stipulated deserved and proportional punishment of
twenty-years imprisonment. A justification for the five-years imprisonment
thus far might thereby collapse into a justification for a punishment of only
five-years imprisonment. Any attempted justification under retributivism for
a constituent part of a temporal term of imprisonment that precluded
justifying the whole punishment would be an unsatisfactory solution.
B. Other Theories 'Justifications
Since there is no apparent retributivist justification for a constituent part
of a temporal term of imprisonment, considering how the other principal
theories of punishment do justify such punishment might be instructive. But
the ways in which these other theories do justify parts of temporal terms of
imprisonment are unavailable to retributivism and raise further conditions for
a satisfactory retributivist justification to meet.
1. Consequentialism
Let us stipulate that twenty-years imprisonment for the offender's crime
is also the punishment that would be justified under consequentialism. 69
Unlike retributivism, consequentialism can justify the five-years
imprisonment thus far if the future good consequences generated by
punishing the offender for twenty years outweigh any bad consequences
incurred by punishing thus far for five years. This consequentialist
justification, however, is unavailable to retributivism. As Antony Duff
explains, retributivism "justifies punishment in terms not of its contingently
beneficial effects but of its intrinsic justice as a response to crime; the
justificatory relationship holds between present punishment and past crime,
not between present punishment and future effects."'70 Thus, under
retributivism, the future, contingent effects of the present punishment of five-
years imprisonment thus far cannot be the basis for justifying the five-years
69 Although the degree of punishment justified by retributivism and
consequentialism for a given crime will perhaps infrequently coincide, stipulating that the
same punishment would be justified by both theories facilitates a clear comparison of the
two theories of punishment.
70 DUFF, supra note 37, at 19-20.
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imprisonment thus far.71 Furthermore, the consequentialist justification
conceives of the five-years punishment thus far as an instrumental good,
rather than the intrinsic good required by retributivism, 72 because it possibly
leads to the good consequences of the offender being punished for twenty
years.
2. H.L.A. Hart's Mixed Theory
To bridge the impasse between retributivism and consequentialism, so-
called "mixed" theories of punishment combine elements of both
consequentialism and retributivism. 73 One of the most influential mixed
theories is H.L.A. Hart's. 74 In setting the amount or degree of punishment,
Hart forges a compromise between consequentialism and retributivism. 75
Deterrence concerns determine the lower limit, or floor, and retributivist
71 For a discussion of various ways in which some retributivists have found the use
of non-contingent consequences to be relevant in justifying punishment, see infra Part
III.B. But as will be demonstrated, the use of these special types of consequences does
not furnish a satisfactory solution to retributivism's inability to justify the infliction of
punishments featuring temporal terms of imprisonment.
72 See supra notes 44-45, 59, and accompanying text.
73 Cesare Beccaria's landmark On Crimes and Punishments in 1764 was perhaps the
first comprehensive mixed theory of punishment. Rather than distinguishing between the
justice of punishment and its good consequences, Beccaria conceives them as
inextricably intertwined: "[T]he more just punishments are, the more sacred and
inviolable is personal security .. " CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 8
(David Young trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1986) (1764). Assuming that "[i]t is better to
prevent crimes than to punish them," id. at 74, Beccaria concludes that "a punishment for
a crime cannot be deemed truly just ... unless the laws have adopted the best possible
means... to prevent that crime." Id. at 60.
74 Hart's account may be the most influential mixed theory in the theoretical
literature. For a discussion of the mixed theory most influential in sentencing codes and
guidelines, see infra Part IV.A. For other notable mixed theories, see EWING, supra note
34, at 300 (justifying punishment by the good consequence of preventing crime by
expressing moral condemnation, but only to the extent deserved); Quinton, supra note 15,
at 12-15 (maintaining that consequentialist concerns justify punishment while
retributivism provides the definition of punishment); Rawls, supra note 1, at 5
(advocating a rule-utilitarian approach in which the justification of punishment
institutions is deterrence, but the rules employed by the punishment institutions are
retributive).
75 Hart conceptualizes consequentialism and retributivism as furnishing different
answers to different questions. As to the question of what justifies the general practice
and institutions of punishment (the "General Justifying Aim"), consequentialism supplies
the answer. HART, supra note 5, at 8-11. As to who may justifiably be punished




considerations determine the upper limit, or ceiling. That is, an offender
should be punished as much as is necessary to sufficiently defer crime, but no
more than what the offender deserves and is proportional to the crime. 76 Like
consequentialism, but unlike retributivism, Hart's mixed theory can justify
the five-years imprisonment thus far. If the good consequences generated by
twenty-years imprisonment outweigh any bad consequences incurred by five-
years imprisonment thus far, the consequentialist component of Hart's mixed
theory is satisfied. And because the five-years imprisonment thus far is less
than the proportional twenty-years imprisonment, the retributivist component
of the mixed theory is satisfied.
But this mixed theory's mode of justification-relying on the future
consequences of punishment-is unavailable to retributivism. The
unavailability of the modes of justification in both Hart's mixed theory and
consequentialism suggest another condition, in addition to the six
enumerated above, to a retributivist justification of the five-years
imprisonment thus far: (7) to avoid retributivism collapsing into
consequentialism or a mixed approach, any attempted retributivist
justification must not resort to the good contingent consequences of the
offender being punished for twenty years.
3. Negative Retributivism
In merely establishing a ceiling or limit on the amount of punishment
that may be inflicted, the retributivist component in Hart's mixed theory has
been termed "negative retributivism." 77 In contrast, retributivism (or positive
retributivism) 78 requires not merely that punishment be equal to or less than
that which is proportional to the crime, but rather that it be no more and no
less. 79 Because negative retributivism merely provides a ceiling on the
7 6 Id. at 25, 79-80, 235-37.
77 The term "negative retributivism" may have originated in John L. Mackie,
Morality and the Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 4 (1982). Hart uses the
term "weakened" retributivism. HART, supra note 5, at 233.
78 Since most, if not all, retributivists use the simple term retributivism to mean
positive retributivism, this Article will also use the term retributivism to mean positive
retributivism, unless otherwise specified. See, e.g., Michael Moore, Punishment, in THE
CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 759, 759 (Robert Audi ed., 2d ed. 1999)
("Retributivism is also not the view (sometimes called 'weak' or 'negative' retributivism)
that only the deserving are to be punished, for desert on such a view typically operates
only as a limiting and not as a justifying condition of punishment."); see also MOORE,
supra note 1, at 88.
79 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. So while positive retributivism requires
that an offender be punished no more than, and no less than, the fullest extent of her just
deserts, John L. Mackie, Retributivism: A Test Case for Ethical Objectivity, in
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 622, 623 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 2d ed. 1986) ("[A]
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amount of punishment but fails to supply an affirmative reason to punish an
offender at all, negative retributivism is generally employed within a mixed
theory and rarely, if ever, employed as a complete justification for
punishment. 80 As Duff explains, negative retributivism "clearly provides no
complete justification ... for it tells us that we may punish the guilty (their
punishment is not unjust), but not that or why we should punish them."81
Moreover, in justifying punishment that is equal to or less than an offender's
proportional and deserved punishment, negative retributivism would find
permissible no punishment at all-zero punishment satisfies negative
retributivism's measure of equal to or less than the deserved and proportional
punishment.82
Under negative retributivism considered as a stand-alone theory of
punishment, the offender's five-years imprisonment thus far is permissible.
The five-years imprisonment thus far satisfies negative retributivism's
criterion of punishment being (equal to or) less than the deserved and
proportional twenty-years imprisonment. But as discussed above, negative
retributivism standing alone, without a consequentialist component, fails to
supply an affirmative reason or justification why someone should be
punished at all.83 In addition, negative retributivism would find permissible
the disproportional punishment of only five-years imprisonment. 84 Thus,
adopting negative retributivism's non-affirmative "justification" of the five-
years imprisonment thus far is an untenable solution for retributivism. This
crime of a certain degree of wrongness positively calls for a proportionate penalty."),
negative retributivism requires that an offender be punished less than, or equal to, her just
deserts. Id. ("[E]ven if someone is guilty of a crime it is wrong to punish him more
severely than is proportional to the crime."). Mackie refers to this as the "quantitative
variant of negative retributivism." Id.
80 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 88 ("Other reasons-typically, crime prevention
reasons-must be added to moral desert, in this view [negative retributivism], for
punishment to be justified."); David Dolinko, Some Thoughts About Retributivism, 101
ETHics 537, 539-44 (1991); Mackie, supra note 79, at 679 ("Even negative retributivism,
however, is not without its problems ... [it does] not say that wrong acts are positively a
reason for imposing penalties .... "); Moore, supra note 78, at 759 (noting that negative
retributivism "operates only as a limiting and not as a justifying condition of
punishment").
81 Duff, supra note 40, at 7 (citation omitted).
82 See, e.g., PRIMORATZ, supra note 2, at 141, 146 (explaining that the negative
retributivism component of Hart's mixed theory sets only an upper limit which may not
be exceeded but does not set a lower limit below which the amount or degree of
punishment may not pass).
83 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
84 Negative retributivism's criterion of punishment equal to or less than the
proportional punishment would find permissible for our hypothetical offender both (i)
five-years imprisonment thus far, and (ii) only five-years imprisonment.
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suggests an additional condition for a satisfactory solution: (8) to avoid
retributivism collapsing into negative retributivism, the five-years
imprisonment thus far must not be justified under retributivism on the basis
that it is less than the proportional, deserved, and justified twenty-years
imprisonment.
IV. ATTEMPTS AT A RETRIBUTIVIST SOLUTION
This Part examines five possible, but ultimately unsuccessful, solutions
for retributivism. Some of the attempted solutions are unpersuasive on their
face. Others, while satisfying one or more of the eight conditions or criteria
for an adequate justification, fail to satisfy them all.
A. The Meaning of Whole Punishment Includes Its Parts
One might claim that included in the meaning of a whole punishment is
any necessary part of that whole punishment.85 For example, part of the
meaning of punishing a culpable wrongdoer with twenty-years imprisonment
is punishing her for five years, ten years, fifteen years, and so on. If twenty-
years imprisonment is justified under retributivism, and if the five years thus
far of imprisonment is part of the meaning of that justified whole
punishment, then the five years thus far of imprisonment must also be
justified.
Although intuitively appealing, the argument is ultimately unpersuasive
for a number of reasons. First, the claim is essentially a reformulated version
of the discredited argument of the greater includes the lesser.86 Second, even
if distinct from the greater/lesser doctrine, to assume that what is true of the
whole is necessarily true of a part of that whole is to commit the "fallacy of
division."8 7 The following example illustrates the fallacy: "This machine is
85 1 am indebted to John Gardner and Ekow Yankah for suggesting various aspects
of this argument.
86 For evidence of the similarity of the two arguments, see Michael Herz, Justice
Byron White and the Argument that the Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV.
227, 239 (1994) (commenting that "'[e]ven in the law the whole generally includes its
parts"' as one of the greater/lesser doctrine's "purest expressions") (quoting Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910)) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). No argument in this Article, however, hinges on whether the two principles
are identical or distinct.
87 See, e.g., John L. Mackie, Fallacies, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra
note 2, at 169, 172-73 ("[A]ttempts to argue from the premise that something is true of
some whole, or of some class considered collectively, to the conclusion that the same is
true of the parts of the whole, or of the class considered distributively (that is, of each of
its members)."); Douglas Walton, Informal Fallacy, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 78, at 431, 432 ("The fallacy of division is ... the error of
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heavy. Therefore, all the parts of this machine are heavy." 88 Of course, there
are numerous heavy machines, for example, an automobile, which contain
light parts, for example, a radiator cap or air filter. While it is not necessarily
the case that what is true of the whole is also true of the part, what is true of
the whole may be true of the part.89 For example, a heavy machine like an
automobile may contain heavy parts, for example, an engine. As a result, to
make the case that what is true of a whole is also true of a part of that whole
requires further argument, "adequaie reason ... evidence [, or] ... must be
explained." 90
No such further argument or explanation is apparent. If punishment X is
the deserved and proportional punishment for an offender's crime (or at the
low end of a range of what is deserved and proportional), then a part of X
(which is necessarily less than X) would necessarily be undeserved and
disproportional. As a result, if whole punishment X is justified, then a
punishment of part of X would necessarily be unjustified under retributivism.
Rather than being able to rely on the principle of division-that what is true
of the whole is necessarily true of the part-retributivism illustrates why the
principle is indeed fallacious. 91
Third, even if the five years imprisonment thus far is included within the
meaning of twenty-years imprisonment, as the proposed solution maintains,
arguing from a property of the whole to a property of its parts .... The problem is that
the property possessed by the whole need not transfer to the parts."). For discussion of
the fallacy of division as applied to legal contexts as well as in relation to the doctrine of
the greater includes the lesser, see Herz, supra note 86, at 242-49.
8 8 DOUGLAS N. WALTON, INFORMAL LOGIC: A HANDBOOK FOR CRITICAL
ARGUMENTATION 130 (1989). For additional examples of reasoning committing the
fallacy of division, see STEPHEN TOULMIN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO REASONING 171-
73 (2d ed. 1984) (supplying the example that if table salt is harmless to ingest, then its
constituent parts-sodium and chlorine-are necessarily also harmless to ingest);
WALTON, supra ("American Indians have reservations in every state. The Navajo are
American Indians. Therefore, the Navajo have reservations in every state."); Mackie,
supra note 87, at 173.
89 WALTON, supra note 88, at 130-31 (noting that forms of argument using the
principle of division "are not all fallacious"); Herz, supra note 86, at 243 ("[T]he parts do
not necessarily [but may] share the characteristics of the whole."); Mackie, supra note 87,
at 173 (indicating that what is true of the whole is also true of the parts "may be
possible"); Walton, supra note 87, at 432 ("[T]he property possessed by the whole need
not [but may] transfer to the parts.").
90 Mackie, supra note 87, at 173.
91 Neither the greater/lesser doctrine nor the principle of division is helpful to
retributivism in specifying a justification of the five-years imprisonment thus far, because
they conflate what retributivism must keep distinct. Otherwise, the justifiability of a
proportional (greater or whole) punishment would entail the justifiability of a




it still does not justify the five-years imprisonment thus far. The proposed
solution fails to satisfy all of the eight enumerated conditions for a
retributivist justification.92 For example, the proposed solution fails to
explain how the five-years imprisonment thus far, even if included within the
meaning of the whole punishment, is deserved, proportional, and an intrinsic
good. And even if the prisoner's punishment thus far somehow was
construed to be deserved and proportional, the proposed solution fails to
explain how any further imprisonment beyond the five-years imprisonment
thus far (for example, the remaining fifteen-years imprisonment) also could
be deserved and proportional. Thus, the proposed solution fails.
B. Conceptual Consequences
Although retributivists generally eschew and criticize the use of
consequences to justify punishment,93 some retributivists contend that special
types of consequences may be utilized without collapsing into
consequentialism. 94 These special types of consequences-conceptual,
logical, or abstract-are purportedly distinguishable from the factual or
contingent consequences utilized by consequentialism. Factual or contingent
consequences may or may not occur, tend to be of a material nature, and are
subject to empirical verification.95  Examples include deterrence,
rehabilitation and, in general, crime prevention. 96 Such consequences are
contingent because punishment will not invariably and necessarily generate
them; a given punishment may or may not, for example, deter crime. The
conceptual consequences that retributivism purportedly may utilize to justify
punishment are those which logically or necessarily follow from punishment,
92 See supra Parts II.A. 1-6 and II.B. The proposed solution, however, does have the
virtue of satisfying at least one of the eight conditions. It does provide somewhat of an
explanation as to how retributivism might treat differently five-years imprisonment thus
far as opposed to only five-years imprisonment. See supra Part II.A.5. While
imprisonment of five years thus far is arguably included within the meaning of twenty-
years imprisonment, punishment of only five-years imprisonment is not. Since the
prisoner receiving only five-years imprisonment precludes the prisoner receiving twenty-
years imprisonment, punishment of only five-years imprisonment is inconsistent with the
meaning of twenty-years imprisonment.
93 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
94 See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 6, at 7; Duff, supra note 40, at 5-6; George P.
Fletcher, Punishment and Responsibility, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY, supra note 34, at 514, 516.
95 DUFF, supra note 6, at 7; Duff, supra note 40, at 5-6; Fletcher, supra note 94, at
516.
96 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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are abstract, and are not subject to empirical verification.97 Examples include
avoiding "bloodguilt" and society's complicity with the crime, 98 annulling or
negating the crime, 99 effecting "a connection with correct values for those
who have flouted them,"100 and "restor[ing] the equilibrium of benefits and
burdens."101 These consequences are purportedly non-contingent because
they are claimed to invariably and necessarily follow from retributive
punishment.
Can retributivism justify the infliction of temporal terms of
imprisonment by resort to conceptual consequences? 0 2  The good
consequence of punishing the offender for five years thus far is that it allows
for the possible attainment of the intrinsic good of the offender being
punished for twenty years. Since whether the offender serves her full term
may or may not happen-the offender may escape from, or die in, prison
prior to the completion of her full sentence-the consequence sought to be
promoted is contingent. It is not a conceptual or logical consequence because
the offender serving twenty years will not necessarily or logically occur as a
result of the offender thus far serving five years of her term. Thus, the
consequences by which retributivism might justify the five years thus far are
not conceptual, but rather contingent. Since retributivism's use of contingent
consequences would collapse retributivism into consequentialism, 10 3 the
proposed solution fails.
C. The Doctrine of Double Effect
An oft-invoked argument to insulate retributivism from criticism is some
variant of St. Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of double effect. 104 Simply put, an
97 DUFF, supra note 6, at 7; Duff, supra note 40, at 5-6; Fletcher, supra note 94, at
516.
98 KANT, supra note 1, at 142.
99 HEGEL, supra note 1, § 97 at 123.
100 NOZICK, supra note 44, at 384.
101 MORRIS, supra note 46, at 34.
102 For the view that various versions of retributivism incorporating conceptual
consequences collapse into consequentialism, see TEN, supra note 35, at 44-46 (noting
that Nozick's theory, see supra text accompanying note 100, collapses into
consequentialism); John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL Q. 238, 243-44
(1979) (arguing that Kant's theory, see supra text accompanying note 98, is justifying
punishment by the avoidance of the bad consequences of not punishing); Quinton, supra
note 15, at 7-8 (contending that Hegel's annulment doctrine, see supra note 39 and text
accompanying note 99, justifies "punishment by its effects, by the desirable future
consequences which it brings about").
103 See supra notes 16, 41.
104 3 ST. THoMAs AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1465 (Fathers of the English
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act, which is not wrong in itself and that has two effects or consequences-
one bad and one good-is permissible if the good effect is intended and the
bad effect, while foreseen, is neither intended as an end in itself nor as a
means to producing the good effect, and the good effect does not arise
through the bad effect.'1 5 For a classic example, in "Strategic Bombing,"
suppose a U.S. bomber pilot is assigned the task of blowing up a munitions
plant in Nazi Germany during WWII. 106 While doing so may be a legitimate
act of war, the destruction of the plant will most likely kill a number of
innocent civilians nearby. According to the doctrine of double effect, if the
act of bombing is not wrong in itself it may be permissible since the good
effect-undermining Nazi Germany's ability to manufacture weapons-is
intended and the bad effect-the death of the innocent civilians-is neither
intended as an end nor as a means to accomplish the good effect, and the
good effect does not arise through the bad effect.' 07 That is, the good effect
of the destruction of the munitions plant does not arise through the bad effect
of the death of the innocent civilians.
Contrast "Strategic Bombing" with the following example termed
"Terror Bombing."'108 Suppose a U.S. bomber pilot is assigned the task of
bombing civilian targets so as to terrorize innocent civilians and undermine
Nazi Germany's will to continue waging war. The act of such bombing has
two effects-one good and one bad. The intended good effect is undermining
Nazi Germany's will to wage war. The bad effect-the death of innocent
civilians-is not only intended as a means to the good effect but also the
Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros, Inc 1947) (1485).
105 For neutral accounts of the doctrine, see SIMON BLACKBURN, OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 109 (1996) ("[A]n action is permissible if (i) the action is
not wrong in itself, (ii) the bad consequence is not that which is intended, (iii) the good is
not itself a result of the bad consequence, and (iv) the two consequences are
commensurate."); Philip E. Devine, Principle of Double Effect, in THE CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 78, at 737, 738 ("[O]ne may produce a
forbidden effect, provided (1) one's action also had a good effect, (2) one did not seek the
bad effect as an end or as a means, (3) one did not produce the good effect through the
bad effect, and (4) the good effect was important enough to outweigh the bad one.").
The fourth clause or condition in each of the above formulations is controversial
because it appears to involve consequentialist reasoning. Mirko Bagoric & Kumar
Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism, 24 MELB. U. L. REv. 124, 146-47 (2000).
Warren Quinn is the doctrine's "most sophisticated and resourceful recent exponent."
Dolinko, supra note 3, at 1634. Quinn argues that the "most important and plausible"
version of the doctrine is found in its first three conditions and ignores the more
controversial fourth condition. Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences:
The Doctrine of Double Effect, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 334, 334 n.3 (1989).
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good effect arises through the bad effect. Thus, such bombing would not be
permissible under the doctrine of double effect.
While the doctrine itself, as well as retributivists' reliance on it, is
heavily criticized, 10 9 retributivists might attempt to employ the doctrine to
render permissible the five-years punishment thus far. The act of inflicting
the temporal term of imprisonment on the offender has two effects: the
intended good effect is that the offender receives her full, proportional
twenty-years imprisonment and the bad effect is that the offender first
receives the undeserved, disproportional five-years imprisonment thus far.
But the doctrine of double effect does not apply; at least two of the doctrine's
conditions are not satisfied. First, the bad effect is intended as a means to the
good effect. In inflicting the offender's punishment, it is intended that the
offender first serve five-years imprisonment en route to serving twenty-years
imprisonment. Second, the good effect arises through the bad effect. In order
for the offender to serve twenty-years imprisonment, the offender must
necessarily first serve five-years imprisonment. The act of inflicting the
temporal term of imprisonment on the offender is analogous to "Terror
Bombing" in which the bad effect is intended as a means to attaining the
good effect and the good effect arises through the bad effect. Since the
conditions for the doctrine of double effect to apply are not satisfied with
respect to the punishment of the offender, the doctrine fails to supply a
solution.110
109 For general criticisms of the doctrine of double effect, see BLACKBURN, supra
note 105, at 109; PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 19 (1978); Dolinko, supra note 3, at 1634; Thomson, supra note 106, at
292-96. For criticisms of the doctrine's use by retributivists, see Bagoric & Amarasekara,
supra note 105, at 144-47; Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice
of 'Just' Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 843, 900-17 (2002); Dolinko, supra note 3, at
1632-35; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 19, at 1273-77 & n.757; Richard 0. Lempert,
Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1177, 1184 (1981); George Schedler, Can Retributivists
Support Legal Punishment?, 63 MONIST 185, 187-90 (1980). For examples of the
doctrine's use by retributivists, see DUFF, supra note 6, at 159; MOORE, supra note 1, at
158. See also RONALD DwORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 79-89 (1985).
110 There is a further difficulty with utilizing the doctrine of double effect to render
permissible the five-years imprisonment thus far. The doctrine's requirement that the act
not be wrong in itself is not satisfied. Since while the offender is being punished the
punishment is unjustified, the act of punishing her is wrong in itself. While the end-result
of twenty-years imprisonment may be justified under retributivism, the act itself is not
and thus is wrong.
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D. Justification by Degrees
In contrast to a binary conception of retributivism's justification of
punishment in which punishment is either justified or unjustified, one might
argue that there are degrees of justification. As such, our offender's serving
(thus far) five years of her twenty-year term satisfies, and is justified by,
retributivism to a degree. As an offender serves more and more of her term
of imprisonment, her punishment is partially justified to a greater and greater
degree until she completes her term of imprisonment, upon which her
punishment is fully justified.
The proposed solution is unpersuasive for three reasons. First, so far as I
know, there is no existing account of retributivism featuring degrees of
justification. 11 Second, even if the punishment of the offender at the various
stages of her prison term may be said to be partially justified to a lesser or
greater degree, the punishment nonetheless remains unjustified to a lesser or
greater degree. That is, if there are degrees of justified punishment under
retributivism, then there must also be degrees of unjustified punishment. As a
result, retributivism cannot entirely justify the infliction of parts of temporal
terms of imprisonment.
Third, and most important, even assuming arguendo that some degree of
justification might suffice for complete justification, the early stages of a
temporal term of imprisonment will nonetheless be overwhelmingly
unjustified and only very slightly justified. We might conceptualize the
degree of justification at the five-year stage of a twenty-year sentence as 25%
justified/75% unjustified, at the ten-year stage 50% justified/50% unjustified,
at the fifteen-year stage 75% justified/25% unjustified, and at completion of
the twenty years the punishment is 100% justified/0% unjustified. Perhaps at
some point when the punishment passes a threshold l 2 at which the
111 While there may be some latitude in what constitutes a deserved and
proportional punishment, this does not entail degrees of justification. Within the range of
what is considered deserved and proportional, a punishment is justified. Outside the range
of what is deemed deserved and proportional, a punishment is undeserved,
disproportional, and unjustified. Therefore, even though there may be latitude in what is a
deserved and proportional punishment, a punishment is either deserved and proportional
or undeserved and disproportional. As a result, a punishment is either justified or not
justified.
112 Even if there may be degrees of justification under retributivism, the decision to
punish or not is binary--either punish or not punish. Thus, if there are degrees of
justification, there must be some measure or standard that correlates degrees of
justification with whether punishment may justifiably be inflicted or not. Some threshold
would have to be established at which a degree of justification at or above the threshold
would support punishment and a degree of justification below the threshold that would
not support punishment. Wherever the threshold was set, there would necessarily be a
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punishment is more justified than unjustified, justification by degree might
suffice for complete justification. But prior to the threshold, at the early
stages of the twenty-year sentence, the punishment is only very slightly
justified and overwhelmingly unjustified. For example, at the one-year stage
the punishment might be only 5% justified and 95% unjustified. A
retributivist could hardly maintain that a punishment that was 95%
unjustified sufficed to render the punishment justified. Because any temporal
term of imprisonment will necessarily start out only slightly justified and
overwhelmingly unjustified, and passing through the early stages is
necessary to reach the later stages, a punishment can never reach the later
stages, in which it will be mostly justified, without first passing through the
early stages, in which it will be overwhelmingly unjustified. As a result, a
degrees of justification approach fails to provide a solution.
E. Narrowing the Scope of Retributivism 's Justification
This section considers how retributivists might concede that retributivism
is unable to justify the infliction of temporal terms of imprisonment but
nonetheless argue that retributivism is not meant to justify such punishment.
First, retributivism may only be meant to justify the articulation or
announcement of an offender's just sentence, but not its infliction. Second,
retributivism's justification may only extend to the end-result of the
completed punishment, but not the actual infliction of punishment. Third,
punishment might be defined such that inflicting constituent parts of
sentences of temporal terms of imprisonment do not constitute punishment,
and thus retributivism, as a theory of punishment, need not justify it.
However, none of the attempts to avoid the problem of justifying temporal
terms of imprisonment by narrowing the scope of retributivism's justification
supply a satisfactory solution.
1. Retributivism Justifies Only the Sentence of Punishment
A retributivist might argue that retributivism is not meant to justify the
actual infliction of punishment or suffering of the offender, but only the
sentence of punishment. In other words, retributivism is only meant to justify
some articulation of the deserved punishment, but not the actual infliction of
the punishment itself.113 Retributivism would thereby be satisfied and the
point in the early stages of a term of punishment (where the punishment would be less
than 1% justified and more than 99% unjustified) that would presumably fall below the
threshold. Since a degrees of justification approach would always find the early stages of
a temporal term of punishment to be overwhelmingly unjustified, it is not a satisfactory
solution.
113 For a discussion of the distinction between the articulation of the sentence and
[Vol. 66:269
TIME AND PUNISHMENT
good of retributivism attained merely by the court announcing the
punishment or the act of sentencing the offender to punishment, which
reflects what the offender deserves. Whether the offender actually serves out
the sentence or actually is punished would thereby be irrelevant to
retributivism.
Of course, this possible solution is unsatisfactory. First, punishing based
on an offender's just deserts does not merely include imposing a sentence of
imprisonment that the offender does not have to serve. When retributivism
speaks of culpable wrongdoers deserving suffering it does not merely mean
that an offender will be informed that he or she will suffer a certain
punishment, but that the actual punishment will never occur.114 Second, it
suggests that retributivism would be satisfied if an offender received a fake
sentence that the authorities would never require that the offender actually
serve. The authorities would merely pretend that the offender was actually
serving the sentence. Retributivists have criticized consequential and mixed
theories of punishment based on deterrence for justifying similar faked
sentences that are never served. 115 Under these theories, the good of
deterrence may be attained without the offender actually serving the sentence
the actual infliction of the punishment, see Markus Dirk Dubber, The Pain of
Punishment, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 545, 555-61 (1996) (explaining that justifying punishment
requires justifying each of "its constituent aspects-threat, imposition [articulation of the
sentence], and infliction").
114 Cf Hampton, supra note 13, at 1686-87. In viewing retributivism as vindicating
the value of the victim, Jean Hampton considers how a farmer who killed a farmhand and
the farmhand's four sons in a particularly degrading way should be punished. Since the
farmer did not merely express in words the diminishment of the victims' worth, merely
announcing or articulating the farmer's guilt and deserved punishment is insufficient.
Hampton suggests that to vindicate the victims the punishment of the farmer must
constitute more than mere words:
Re-establishment of the acknowledgment of the victims's worth is normally not
accomplished by the mere verbal or written assertion of the equality of worth of
wrongdoer and victim. For a judge or jury merely to announce, after reviewing the
facts of the farmer's murder of the farmhand and his sons, that he is guilty of murder
and that they were his equal in value, is to accomplish virtually nothing. The farmer,
by his action, did not just "say" that these men were worthless relative to him, but
also sought to make them into nothing by fashioning events that purported to
establish their extreme degradation.... This representation of degradation requires
more than just a few idle remarks to deny. When we face actions that not merely
express the message that a person is degraded relative to the wrongdoer, but also try
to establish that degradation, we are morally required to respond by trying to remake
the world in a way that denies what the wrongdoer's events have attempted to
establish, thereby lowering the wrongdoer, elevating the victim, and annulling the
act of diminishment.
Id.
115 MOORE, supra note 1, at 100-02; PRIMORATZ, supra note 2, at 42-43.
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as long as other members of society believe that the offender is in fact being
punished."l 6 Moore concludes that a theory that would justify only the
announcement of a sentence or punishment, but not the actual serving of the
sentence, is untenable."l 7 Retributivism then would suffer from the same
failing by which retributivists have condemned consequentialism and mixed
theories. Third, the actual infliction of punishment, not the articulation of the
sentence, "presents the most pressing justificatory challenge," 1 8 and is "the
crucial issue." ' 19 As a result, justifying only the sentence, or some
articulation of punishment, but not the actual infliction of punishment, is not
a satisfactory solution for retributivism.
116 MOORE, supra note 1, at 100-01. Consequentialists readily acknowledge that to
achieve general deterrence, the appearance or publicization of punishment is crucial.
Actual punishment, without society's awareness, generates no general deterrent effect.
See BENTHAM, supra note 35, at 192 ("Punishment cannot act any farther than in as far as
the idea of it, and of its connection with the offence, is present in the mind. The idea of it,
if not present, cannot act at all; and then the punishment itself must be
inefficacious."). Without the publicizing of imposed punishments, the general deterrent
effect will be minimized:
If delinquents were constantly punished for their offences, and nobody else knew of
it, it is evident that.., there would be a great deal of mischief done, and not the
least particle of good .... The punishment would befal every offender as an
unforeseen evil. It would never have been present to his mind to deter him from the
commission of crime. It would serve as an example to no one.
Bentham, supra note 38, at 399. Apparent punishment, however, even if without actual
punishment, does provide general deterrence:
It is the idea only of the punishment (or, in other words, the apparent punishment)
that really acts upon the mind; the punishment itself (the real punishment) acts not
any farther than as giving rise to that idea. It is the apparent punishment, therefore,
that does all the service, I mean in the way of example, which is the principal object.
BENTHAM, supra note 35, at 193 (citation omitted). Actual punishment serves only to
produce apparent punishment. Bentham, supra note 38, at 398 ("Ought any real
punishments to be inflicted? most certainly. Why? for the sake of producing the
appearance of it."). Bentham declares that faked punishment is preferable to actual
punishment if faked punishment would produce the same deterrent effect: "If hanging a
man in effigy would produce the same salutary impression of terror upon the minds of the
people, it would be folly or cruelty ever to hang a man in person." Id. However, once the
public found out about faked punishments, the deterrent effect would be lost. Given the
prospect of the public inevitably discovering faked punishments, consequentialism
perhaps would no longer justify faked punishments.
117 MOORE, supra note 1, at 101-02.
118 Dubber, supra note 113, at 555.
119 Id. at 559.
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2. Retributivism Justifies Only the End-Result of Punishment
It might be argued that retributivism is not meant to justify the actual
infliction of punishment, but rather only the end-result of punishment. The
argument is unpersuasive for a number of reasons. First, it may simply be
false. As George Fletcher observes, unlike consequentialism, "[t]he critical
feature of a retributive argument is that if it is sound, it justifies punishment
as of the moment that the punishment is imposed."' 120 Thus, retributivism's
justification does not wait until after the punishment has been completed but
rather purports to justify punishment from the beginning of its infliction. And
unlike consequentialism, under retributivism, "[o]ne need not wait to see
whether the predicted good (deterrence, avoiding private vendettas) actually
occurs." 12 1 Second, if retributivism is only meant to justify the end-result of
punishment, retributivism would risk collapse into consequentialism in
justifying prospectively by the contingent effects and consequences of
punishment. 122 Retributivist punishment would thereby be an instrumental
good rather than an intrinsic good.123 Thus, restricting the scope of
retributivism's justification to the end-result of punishment, but not its actual
infliction, is an unsatisfactory solution to retributivism's difficulty with
justifying temporal terms of imprisonment.
3. Restricting Retributivism 's Definition of Punishment
It might be objected that a constituent part of a temporal term of
imprisonment does not constitute punishment. As such, retributivism's
inability to justify that which is not punishment is not problematic. For
example, while twenty-years imprisonment for our offender's crime is
punishment, and thus must be justified, the five years of imprisonment thus
far is not punishment and thus need not be justified. The objection is
unpersuasive for a number of reasons.
The argument featured in the objection is an example of what H.L.A.
Hart termed a "definitional stop." 124 A definitional stop resolves, by an
artificial definition, what should be resolved by substantive argument.
125
120 GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 417 (1978).
121 Id
122 See supra notes 16, 41, 46, and accompanying text.
123 For retributivism's requirement that punishment be an intrinsic, and not an
instrumental, good, see supra notes 41-45, 59-61, and accompanying text.
124 HART, supra note 5, at 5.
125 For example, Thomas Hobbes defined away the possibility of a retributivist
conception of punishment. Hobbes defined punishment in such a way as to exclude from
punishment that which does not have a general deterrent effect:
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Resolving substantive issues of punishment theory by definitions of
punishment would allow, for example, consequentialists to define
punishment as only that imposed against actually guilty defendants. 126 Under
that definition, consequentialist theories of punishment would no longer be
subject to the retributivist criticism that consequentialism justifies the
intentional punishment of innocents. This is because innocents, by that
definition, could not be punished. 127 Definitional stops are generally frowned
upon because they define away all the difficult issues without substantively
resolving them-Hart declared definitional stops to be impermissible as an
"abuse of definition."'128 But if a definitional stop is to be used by
retributivists to avoid the charge that retributivism cannot justify the
infliction of temporal terms of imprisonment, then consequentialists could
also employ a definitional stop to avoid the most damning criticism
retributivists have levied against consequentialism. 129
In addition to relying on an artificial definition of punishment that no
other theory of punishment would require, the artificial definition fails to
supply retributivism with an account of how the offender's imprisonment is
justified. Even if the early stages of a temporal term of imprisonment may be
If the harm inflicted be lesse than the benefit, or contentment that naturally
followeth the crime committed, that harm is not within the definition [of
punishment]; and is rather the Price, or Redemption, than the Punishment of a
Crime: Because it is of the nature of Punishment, to have for end, the disposing of
men to obey the Law ....
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 166 (J.M. Dent & Sons 1976) (1651); see also id. at 164
("A Punishment, is an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath done, or
omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority to be a Transgression of the Law; to
the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience.") (emphasis
omitted).
126 See, e.g., Quinton, supra note 15, at 10 ("The infliction of suffering on a person
is only properly described as punishment if that person is guilty. The retributivist thesis,
therefore, is not a moral doctrine, but an account of the meaning of the word
'punishment."').
127 See, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 125, at 168 ("All Punishments of Innocent
subjects, be they great or little, are against the Law of Nature: For Punishment is only for
Transgression of the Law, and therefore there can be no Punishment of the Innocent.").
128 HART, supra note 5, at 5.
129 For the view that the most damaging criticism of consequentialism is that it
justifies punishment of the innocent, see, for example, MOORE, supra note 1, at 93 n. 19
("The main problem with the pure utilitarian [consequentialist] theory of punishment is
that it potentially sacrifices the innocent in order to achieve a collective good.");
Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 1341 ("[T]he most damaging aspect of the [retributivist]
attack is that utilitarianism admits the possibility of justified punishment of the
innocent."); Quinton, supra note 15, at 9 (observing that retributivists' "crucial charge is
that utilitarians permit the punishment of the innocent").
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defined so as to not constitute punishment, the same problem remains: how
can retributivism justify the offender having been in prison for five years
thus far? Under the proposed definition of punishment, retributivism cannot
and need not justify her imprisonment thus far because it is not punishment
and retributivism can only justify punishment. But even if, or perhaps
especially if, the offender's incarceration thus far of five years is not
punishment, a justification is required for intentionally inflicting the harm,
suffering and deprivation encompassing involuntary incarceration. 130 If
retributivism fails to supply a justification, it can no longer ever reach the
stage where incarceration results in 'punishment' because it lacks a
justification for 'nonpunishing' offenders during the earlier stages. As a
result, utilizing a definitional stop to craft an artificial definition of
punishment fails to furnish a solution to retributivism's inability to justify
temporal terms of imprisonment.
V. SENTENCING THEORY AND PRACTICE
This Part broadens the scope of the difficulty in justifying temporal terms
of imprisonment beyond theoretical accounts of retributivism. Examination
of the consensus sentencing approach underlying state and federal sentencing
codes and guidelines as well as the proposed revisions of The American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code Sentencing provisions 131 reveals that any
sentencing scheme setting a lower limit or minimum punishment for a given
offense by the retributivist principles of desert and proportionality is unable
to justify any temporal term of imprisonment for any offender. As a result,
this consensus approach may have to be abandoned. In addition, the broader
specification of the scope of the problem may provide the conceptual
framework for abolishing the widely reviled sentencing practice of
mandatory minimums. That any sentencing approach setting the minimum
punishment for a given offense by the retributivist principles of desert and
proportionality is unable to justify temporal terms of imprisonment
undermines the primary rationale for mandatory minimums.
A. The Consensus Approach
While retributivism enjoys the mantle of being the leading theoretical
justification of punishment, 132 Norval Morris's mixed theory-variously
130 The intentional infliction of harm, suffering and deprivation-regardless of
whether it is classified as punishment or not-is prima facie wrong and requires
justification. See supra notes 6, 35, and accompanying text.
131 See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
132 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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termed "modified just desert," "limiting retributivism," or, simply, "LR"- is
hailed as the "reigning"'133 and "consensus" 134 approach utilized in
sentencing codes and guidelines. 135 Some version of LR is claimed to be the
underlying philosophy of "every state sentencing commission that has issued
sentencing guidelines"I 36-as many as twenty states-, 137 the federal
sentencing guidelines, 138 and many international sentencing codes. 139 LR is
also the guiding theory for the proposed revisions of the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code Sentencing provisions. 140
133 Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 20, at 53 ("[M]odified just desert [or LR] is our
nation's reigning sentencing philosophy.").
134 Frase, supra note 21, at 2.
135 For accounts of Morris's LR theory, see MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 13, at 84-
89; MORRIS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 4, at 178-209; MORRIS, supra note 24, at 58-84;
Andrew von Hirsch, Equality, 'Anisonomy', and Justice: A Review of Madness and the
Criminal Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1093, 1093-1112 (1984) (book review).
136 Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 20, at 24 (citing, for example, Minnesota's and
Pennsylvania's sentencing guidelines).
137 The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines have adopted LR. See Frase, supra note
21, at 24 ("The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, in effect since 1980, provide a
particularly strong example of a successful guidelines-based LR system in operation.");
Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Reform in Minnesota, Ten Years After: Reflections on Dale
G. Parent's Structuring Criminal Sentences: The Evolution of Minnesota's Sentencing
Guidelines, 75 MINN. L. REv. 727, 744-45 (1991) (book review) (same). "Minnesota's
pioneering sentencing reform has now been emulated in almost twenty states ......
Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice 22 CRIME & JUST. 363,
430 (1997) (citations omitted); see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING xxi-xxii (3d ed., Chicago: ABA Press, 1994) ("This
model [Minnesota] has dominated recent sentencing reform at the state level."); MORRIS
& TONRY, supra note 13, at 49 ("Many states have now followed in Minnesota's
footsteps."). Since Minnesota's sentencing guidelines have adopted LR, and almost
twenty states have emulated Minnesota's example, therefore as many as twenty states
have adopted LR as the underlying philosophy of their sentencing guidelines.
138 Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 20, at 24 (concluding that "the vast majority of
the federal sentencing guidelines clearly implement a philosophy of punishment
commonly called 'modified just desert"'). For a discussion of the equivalence of the
modified just desert approach and LR, see supra note 20.
139 Frase, supra note 21, at 21 ("Most other Western countries, including those in
the civil law as well as common law legal families, also employ ... a loose version of
LR.").
140 See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 22. The proposed revision, in
relevant part, is as follows:
Revised Section 1.02(2). Purposes; Principles of Construction.
(2) The general purposes of the provisions governing sentencing and
corrections.., are:




While retributivism, or "defining retributivism,"' 141 seeks to precisely
determine-no more and no less than what an offender deserves-the
appropriate punishment, 142 LR finds greater latitude in what constitutes a
deserved and proportional punishment. Drawing on the imprecision of
retributivism in fixing precisely an offender's deserved, proportional
punishment, 143 under LR the retributivist concerns of proportionality and
desert determine the lower and upper limits of a range of what shall
constitute a permissible punishment. 144 For example, with respect to our
hypothetical offender whose proportional, deserved punishment was
(i) to render punishment within a range of severity sufficient but
not excessive to reflect the gravity of offenses and the
blameworthiness of offenders;
(ii)... to serve goals of offender rehabilitation, general
deterrence, incapacitation of dangerous offenders, and restoration of
crime victims and communities, provided that these goals are pursued
within the boundaries of sentence severity permitted in subsection
(a)(i) ....
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 22, at 129 (app. A).
141 MORRIS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 4, at 161 (by contrast with LR setting a
range of deserved punishment for a given offense, retributivism or defining retributivism
determines a precise punishment (no more and no less) for a given offense).
142 See supra note 13.
143 See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 22, at 37 ("One key insight in
Morris's LR theory is that a retributive evaluation of how much punishment is deserved
in a given case can seldom be made with precision."); MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 13:
Desert considerations do not, and cannot, define the specific punishment warranted
... but they can give guidance as to limits. The concept of 'just desert' sets the
maximum and minimum of the sentence...; it does not give any more fine-tuning
to the appropriate sentence than that. Nor should it.
Id. at 104-05; MORRIS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 4, at 148-49 ("It is rarely possible to
say with precision, 'that is the deserved punishment.' All one can properly say, I submit,
is 'that is not an undeserved punishment.' Desert defines a range of punishments.")
(citation omitted); MORRIS, supra note 24, at 75 ("Desert is, of course, not precisely
quantifiable.").
144 See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 22, at 40 ("Retribution works as
a boundary at both extremes of lenity and severity."); MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 13,
at 105 ("The concept of 'just desert' sets the maximum and minimum of the sentence that
may be imposed for any offense .... "); MORRIS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 4, at 149,
199 (same); Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy, and Craziness, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1485,
1497 (1984) (book review) ("[D]esert sets an upper maximum (beyond which
punishment is too severe) and a lower minimum (beneath which punishment is too
lenient, thus depreciating the seriousness of the offense)."); see also supra note 24. Under
the proposed Model Penal Code Sentencing provisions, the requirement of determining
the punishment for a given offense as within a range of deserved, proportional
punishment is embodied in Revised Section 1.02(2)(a)(i). See supra note 140.
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stipulated to be (no less than) twenty-years imprisonment, LR would declare
a range of, for example, from twenty to twenty-two (or from twenty to
twenty-five) years of imprisonment as the deserved, proportional
punishment. Only within that range of deserved, proportional punishment
may consequentialist concerns of incapacitation, deterrence, and
rehabilitation inform whether an offender receives a punishment closer to
(but still within) the lower or upper limit. 145
A comparison of LR with the other principal theories of punishment may
be helpful. Like retributivism, negative retributivism, and Hart's mixed
theory, but unlike consequentialism, LR sets an upper limit or maximum on
the amount of punishment based on the retributivist principles of desert and
proportionality. 146 In contrast, consequentialism sets the upper limit based on
consequentialist principles. Like retributivism, but unlike negative
retributivism, Hart's mixed theory, and consequentialism, LR sets a lower
limit or minimum based on the retributivist principles of proportionality and
desert. In contrast, consequentialism and Hart's mixed theory set the lower
limit or minimum based on consequentialist considerations; negative
retributivism sets no lower limit or minimum at all. And like Hart's theory,
but unlike retributivism, negative retributivism, and consequentialism, LR
combines both retributive and consequential considerations. The key
difference between Hart's theory and LR, however, is that Hart's theory sets
the lower limit or minimum based on consequential considerations, and LR
bases it on retributive considerations.
But while Hart's mixed theory can justify inflicting a constituent part of
145 See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 22, at 39 ("Within the
permissible range of severity, LR provides that the utilitarian purposes of punishment
may be weighed."); MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 13, at 107-08 (explaining that within
the range of permissible deserved punishment, the precise punishment is "then fine-tuned
by ideas of social protection, economizing with scarce punishment resources and the
minimization of suffering .. "); Morse, supra note 144, at 1491 ("Within that range,
consequentialist concerns will appropriately dictate the punishment in a particular
case."); see also supra note 25. Under the proposed revisions of the Model Penal Code
Sentencing provisions, that consequentialist considerations may determine the degree of
punishment within the range of permissible punishment is embodied in Revised Section
1.02(2)(a)(ii). See supra note 140. The Report emphasizes that consequentialist concerns
can never warrant a punishment outside the range of proportional punishment: "In no
circumstances, however, may the court choose a penalty that would be clearly insufficient
on desert grounds to respond to the seriousness of the offense and the blameworthiness of
the offender." THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 22, at 40.
146 In a sense, retributivism sets upper and lower limits on the amount of deserved
punishment. But since retributivism justifies punishment that is no more and no less than
what is deserved, the lower and upper limits under retributivism may be identical or quite
close. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. In contrast, the range between LR's
upper and lower limits may be broader.
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a temporal term of imprisonment, 147 LR cannot. LR incurs the same problem
as retributivism in attempting to justify the offender's five-years
imprisonment thus far. The five-years imprisonment thus far is undeserved
and disproportional by being outside the range of what LR would consider
proportional and deserved (for example, from twenty to twenty-five years of
imprisonment). While the consequentialist component of Hart's mixed theory
facilitates justifying the five-years imprisonment thus far, 14 8  the
consequentialist component of LR is inapplicable because it only operates
within the range of what is deserved and proportional. 14 9 The five-years
imprisonment thus far is outside that range and thus undeserved and
disproportional. Since it is first necessary to inflict the five-years
imprisonment in order to inflict the twenty to twenty-two (or twenty to
twenty-five) years of imprisonment, the inability to justify the five-years thus
far of imprisonment precludes LR's ability to justify the twenty to twenty-
two (or twenty to twenty-five) years of imprisonment.
That LR fails to justify temporal terms of imprisonment broadens the
scope of the problem as a theoretical matter. Not only retributivism, but any
theory or scheme of punishment setting the lower limit of punishment 150 for
a given offense solely by the retributivist principles of proportionality and
desert is unable to justify any temporal term of imprisonment for any
offender. 151 This is because the very early stages of a temporal term of
imprisonment will necessarily be less than, and fall outside of, the minimum
or lower limit of deserved punishment.
LR's inability to justify temporal terms of imprisonment also broadens
the scope of the problem as a practical matter. While few (if any) sentencing
codes are purely retributivist, LR is the consensus model of actual sentencing
codes and guidelines. As a result, to the extent that state and federal
147 See supra Part II.B.2.
148 See supra Part II.B.2.
149 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
150 This is assuming that the lower limit is greater than zero time in prison.
151 Of the theories of punishment considered in this Article, only retributivism and
limiting retributivism set a lower limit of punishment by the principles of proportionality
and desert. In contrast, consequentialism and Hart's mixed theory set the lower limit by
consequentialist concerns. As a result, while the latter two theories can justify temporal
terms of imprisonment, the former two theories cannot.
While negative retributivism sets the upper limit by the principles of desert and
proportionality, it sets no lower limit whatsoever. Although negative retributivism avoids
the specific problem besetting retributivism and LR as outlined in this Article, negative
retributivism also cannot justify temporal terms of imprisonment but for a different
reason. By setting no lower limit at all, negative retributivism fails to supply an
affirmative justification for any punishment of any type whatsoever. For further
discussion of this difficulty of negative retributivism as a stand-alone theory of
punishment, see supra Part II.B.3.
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sentencing guidelines do incorporate LR, those sentencing guidelines and
codes also fail to justify any temporal term of imprisonment for any offender.
In addition, the inability of LR to justify the most important and prevalent
type of punishment for serious offenses-temporal terms of imprisonment-
should give the American Law Institute pause in adopting LR as the basis for
revising the Model Penal Code Sentencing provisions.
B. Mandatory Minimums
Retributivism's and LR's inability to justify inflicting temporal terms of
imprisonment may also provide support for eliminating the much-maligned
"mandatory minimums." 152  Statutory or guidelines-based mandatory
minimum sentences require a sentencing judge to impose a sentence not less
than the stipulated minimum temporal term of imprisonment. 153 These
mandatory minimums have been criticized often for hindering a judge's
discretion in imposing a lesser sentence where warranted.154 They have also
been criticized for leading to draconian punishments, and the dramatic over-
incarceration of America's citizens. 155 n the keynote speech to the American
Bar Association Annual Meeting in August 2003, Justice Anthony Kennedy
lamented "the inadequacies-and the injustices-in our prison and
correctional systems." 156 After referencing the scope of our correctional
apparatus-2.1 million imprisoned, an incarceration rate of seven times that
of European countries, the disparate impact on African-Americans, and the
economic cost of over forty billion dollars157-Justice Kennedy concluded
152 See supra note 26.
153 For an example, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
154 See, e.g., Criticizing Sentencing Rules, U.S. Judge Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
30, 1990, at 22 (reporting federal district court Judge J. Lawrence Irving's resignation in
protest over the harshness of mandatory minimum sentencing).
155 See, e.g., Lowenthal, supra note 26, at 65, 121 (noting harmful effects of the
overly harsh mandatory minimums); id. at 72 ("Not surprisingly, prison populations have
increased dramatically since the proliferation of mandatory punishment laws....
[M]andatory punishment provisions must be counted as major contributor for several
reasons."); see also, supra notes 26-27, and infra notes 156-163, and accompanying text.
156 Kennedy, supra note 28, at 2.
157 Justice Kennedy noted the "remarkable scale," of our nation's prison system:
The nationwide inmate population today is 2.1 million people. In California,
even as we meet, this State alone keeps over 160,000 persons behind bars. In
countries such as England, Italy, France, and Germany, the incarceration rate is
about 1 in 1,000 persons. In the United States it is about 1 in 143.
We must confront another reality. Nationwide, more than 40% of the prison
population consists of African-American inmates. About 10% of African-American
men in their mid-to-late 20s are behind bars. In some cities more than 50% of young
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that "our punishments [are] too severe, our sentences too long."'158 Justice
Kennedy identified mandatory minimum sentences as the principal culprit: "I
can accept neither the necessity nor the wisdom of federal mandatory
minimum sentences. In too many cases, mandatory minimum sentences are
unwise and unjust."'1 59 Justice Kennedy then implored the American Bar
Association to recommend to Congress, "Please, Senators and
Representatives, repeal federal mandatory minimums."' 160 In a public address
the following month, Justice Stephen Breyer also spoke out against
mandatory minimums as "set[ting] back the cause of fairness in
sentencing."' 16 1 He added that Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and "others on our Court" also disapproved of mandatory
minimums. 162 In addition to these Supreme Court justices, twelve of the
federal courts of appeals have issued statements criticizing mandatory
minimums. 163
While the promulgation of mandatory minimums was officially based on
a number of punishment goals, retributivism is perceived to be the primary
motivation. 164 The U.S. Sentencing Commission reported to Congress that
"the most commonly-voiced goal of mandatory minimum penalties" is a
retributivist/just deserts approach.' 65 A number of commentators have also
identified retributivism as the principal impetus for mandatory minimums.1 66
African-American men are under the supervision of the criminal justice system.
While economic costs, defined in simple dollar terms, are secondary to human
costs, they do illustrate the scale of the criminal justice system. The cost of housing,
feeding, and caring for the inmate population in the United States is over 40 billion
dollars per year. In the State of California alone, the cost of maintaining each inmate
in the correctional system is about $26,000 per year. And despite the high
expenditures in prison, there remain urgent, unmet needs in the prison system.
Id.
158 Id. at 3.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 4.
161 Breyer, supra note 28, at 11.
162 Id. at 10-I 1.
163 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
164 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text, and infra notes 165-173 and
accompanying text.
165 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 13.
166 See, e.g., PAMALA L. GRISET, DETERMINATE SENTENCING: THE PROMISE AND
REALITY OF RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 3 (1991) ("The determinate sentencing proposals that
gained prominence in the late 1960s and early 1970s were rooted in theories of retributive
justice, disclaiming reliance on crime-control objectives."); JAMES WHITMAN, HARSH
JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND
EUROPE 49-59 (2003) (tracing the rise of harsh, mandatory sentences and determinate
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Justice Kennedy himself offered as a possible explanation James Whitman's
account, in his recent book Harsh Justice,167 of the dovetailing of two
political movements, each embracing a different version of retributivism.
168
According to Whitman, the liberal, secular, "gentler"'169 retributivism
movement advocated a formal egalitarianism that would expunge the
sentencing on a particularly tough version of retributivism); David Dolinko, The Future
of Punishment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1719, 1720, 1722 (1999) (linking the rise of
retributivism with "the spread of mandatory minimum sentencing laws"); Dolinko, supra
note 80, at 538 ("This born-again retributivism has had a substantial impact on the
criminal justice system, for example by fueling the recent trend toward determinate
sentencing."); Robert L. Misner, A Strategy for Mercy, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303,
1303-04 (2000) (correlating the public's shift toward retributivism with the adoption of
mandatory minimum sentencing); Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV., (forthcoming 2004), (noting that retributivism's influence has led to
mandatory minimum sentencing), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract-413660
(last visited Feb. 27, 2004); Jonathan Simon, On Their Own: Delinquency Without
Society, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 1001, 1002 (1999) ("[P]unishments have become more
severe and are being allocated in modes evocative of retributive justice, illustrated by the
greater use of guidelines, mandatory minimums, and determinate sentences.") (citations
omitted); Jane L. Froyd, Comment, Safety Valve Failure: Low-Level Drug Offenders and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1471, 1488 (2000) ("This goal of
retribution or 'just deserts' was the most commonly voiced reason for instituting
mandatory minimum penalties.") (citation omitted); Karen Lutjen, Note, Culpability and
Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The
Punishment No Longer Fits the Criminal, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
389, 394 (1996) ("A combination of retributive and retaliatory philosophies fathered the
outburst of mandatory minimum statutes."). But see Donald P. Lay, Rethinking the
Guidelines: A Call for Cooperation, 101 YALE L.J. 1755, 1756 (1992) (referring to the
Congressional enactment of mandatory minimums as "politically expedient");
Lowenthal, supra note 26, at 67 ("The principal rationales of mandatory sentencing laws
are utilitarian.") (citation omitted); Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 434, 434 (1992) ("In short, mandatory sentences involve politics, not purposes [of
punishment].").
167 See generally WHITMAN, supra note 166.
168 In criticizing the severity and cost of mandatory minimum sentences, Justice
Kennedy offers the following possible explanation for their adoption:
Professor James Whitman considers some of these matters in his recent book Harsh
Justice. He argues that one explanation for severe sentences is the coalescence of
two views coming from different parts of the political spectrum. One view warns
against being soft on crime; the other urges a rigid, egalitarian approach to sentence
uniformity.
Kennedy, supra note 28, at 3-4.
169 WHITMAN, supra note 166, at 194 (chronicling that as the harsher brand of
retributivism was taking root in the mid-1970s, "the academic philosophers who




excessive disparity, often racial, from sentencing practice with the hope of
milder punishment. 170 The conservative, Christian-based, law-and-order,
even "fascist,"' 171 harsh retributivism movement also seeks to reduce
sentencing disparity, but with a view toward more severe punishments. 172
Thus, under the banner of retributivism, both groups, Justice Kennedy
concluded, "agree on mandatory minimum sentences."'1 73
That any scheme of punishment setting a minimum amount of
punishment for a given offense based on retributivist principles of desert fails
to justify temporal terms of imprisonment supplies a conceptual framework
for eliminating mandatory minimums. The early stages of any mandatory
minimum temporal term of imprisonment will necessarily be undeserved,
disproportional, and thus unjustified under retributivism and LR. Even
though mandatory minimums might be justified by other theories of
punishment, the inability of retributivism and LR to justify mandatory
minimums considerably weakens their theoretical support. Moreover, to the
extent that retributivism is popularly perceived to be the primary motivation
for mandatory minimums, the argument of this Article erodes that basis for
popular support. While maximum, or upper limits on, temporal terms of
imprisonment may be justified by retributivist principles, mandatory
minimums cannot. Ironically, although mandatory minimums are widely
assailed as excessively harsh, the argument of this Article demonstrates that
they are unjustified under retributivism because of their infliction of
undeservedly and disproportionally lenient punishment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The implicit and unanalyzed assumption in punishment theory-if a
whole punishment is justified, then a constituent part of that whole
punishment necessarily also must be justified-is false with respect to
retributivism. The assumption is also false with respect to any theory or
scheme of punishment that sets the lower limit of the degree of punishment
for a given offense based on the retributivist principles of proportionality and
desert. While the falsity of this assumption for such accounts of punishment
170 Id. at 53-54, 194.
171 Id. at 202-03 (describing "the resemblance between the criminal justice of the
United States today and the criminal justice of the fascists, and in particular of the
Nazis"). Whitman bases the resemblance largely on the "'primitive' retributivism" both
share. Id. at 202.
172 Id. at 53-54. According to Whitman, "contemporary America['s] ...
spectacularly harsh and degrading brand of retributivism," id. at 24, arose in the mid-
1970s and "is closely associated both with populist justice and with deep-seated Christian
sentiment." Id. at 194.
173 Kennedy, supra note 28, at 4.
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perhaps does not undermine their justification for all types of punishments, it
does undermine their ability to justify any divisible punishment, for example,
temporal terms of imprisonment. If the (lower limit of a) proportional and
deserved punishment for an offender's crime is X time in prison, then
punishment of part of X will necessarily be disproportional, undeserved, and
unjustified. Since X cannot be inflicted without first inflicting a part of X, the
inability to justify a part of X precludes the ability to justify X as well. As a
result, such theories or schemes of punishment are unable to justify the
infliction of any temporal term of imprisonment for any offender or offense.
This problem is not merely of theoretical concern. Limiting retributivism
(LR), a mixed or hybrid approach to punishment that incorporates both
retributivist and consequentialist principles, is also unable to justify temporal
terms of imprisonment. Hailed as the consensus model of sentencing, LR is
the underlying approach in state and federal sentencing guidelines and codes
as well as the newly proposed revisions of the Model Penal Code Sentencing
provisions. By fixing a minimum amount of punishment for a given offense
by the retributivist principles of proportionality and desert, sentencing
guidelines and codes adopting LR fail to justify the infliction of temporal
terms of imprisonment. In addition, to the extent that the much criticized
mandatory minimum sentencing laws are supported by retributivism or LR,
this Article provides the conceptual framework supporting their elimination.
Neither the leading theoretical account of punishment nor the consensus
approach utilized in sentencing codes and guidelines is able to justify the
most important mode of punishment for serious offenses-temporal terms of
imprisonment. Without a solution to this difficulty, consequentialist
considerations must inform the determination of any lower limit of the
degree of punishment for any given offense. Although this stricture
forecloses the viability of a purely retributivist approach, it does not bar
retributivist principles altogether. Retributivist considerations may be
incorporated, but only in setting the maximum or upper limit of the degree of
punishment. Of the theories of punishment canvassed here, with respect to
justifying temporal terms of imprisonment, either consequentialism or a
mixed approach (that sets the lower limit of punishment by consequentialist
principles and the upper limit by either retributivist or consequentialist
principles) must be adopted.
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